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A N
ACCOUNT
OF THE
EARL of *Peterborow's*
Conduct in *SPAIN*, &c.

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AN
ACCOUNT
OF THE
Earl of Peterborow's
CONDUCT
IN
SPAIN,

Chiefly since the raising the
Siege of *Barcelona*, 1706.

To which is added the
Campagne of VALENCIA.

With Original PAPERS.

*Fuisse patientem, suorumq; injurias ferentem civi-
um, quod se Patria irasci nefas esse duceret,
HÆC SUNT TESTIMONIA. Cum cum
propter invidiam cives præsicere exercitui noluis-
sent——eoq; errore eo esset deducta illa militum
multitudo, ut omnes de salute pertimerent;
desiderari capta est Epaminondæ diligentia.
Corn. Nep. in Vita Epaminondæ.*

London, Printed for Jonah Bowyer, at the
Rose in Ludgate-street. 1707.

AN
ACCOUNT
OF THE
EARL OF Peterborough's
CONDUCT
IN
SPAIN

Chiefly since the raising the
Siege of Barcelona, 1706.

TO WHICH
Campaigns of
FENICIA
With Original PAPERS.



Enisse pateriam, furoribus insurris perentem et
nam, quod se patrie irae non esse ducit,
HANC SUAVI TESTIMONIA. Cum enim
propter invidiam eius praesentem existeret non
fuit — eod. errore eo esse deinde illa militum
moderata, ut omnes de salute permississent;
desiderari caute et Hispaniis diligenter
Cogn. Sup. in Vita Hispaniis.

London, Printed for James Bower, at the
Rose in Pall-mall, 1707.

The Dedication.
To the Right Honourable,

CHARLES

EARL of

Peterborough and Monmouth, &c.

My Lord,

Among the many Favours I
receiv'd from Your Lordship
in Spain, (which I am alike inca-
pable of forgetting, and returning)
that easiness of Access and noble Open-
ness of Mind, which are so pecu-
liar

The Dedication.

liar and engaging in Your Lordship, have made the strongest Impressions upon me: for to these I owe the advantage of knowing Your Lordship; the only thing requisite to convince any one of Your great Capacity and Worth. By these means I was not only a near Witness of all those eminent Services, that Your Lordship did for the Publick; but was also in some measure acquainted with the Motives, upon which You undertook them, and the Wise as well as Courageous Manner, in which You conducted them. Had others enjoy'd the same opportunities I did, they must have had the same inward Value for Your Lordship I have: all attempts to obscure the Lustre of your great Actions wou'd then have been vain and impotent; and the United Thanks of your Country wou'd e'er this time have render'd any account of them unnecessary. It

The Dedication.

It was for the sake of those who have been misled, and who, I hope, are not unwilling to be undeceived, that Your Lordship was pleas'd to put some of Your Original Papers into my Hands. I now beg leave to return them to Your Lordship with a few Observations; wherein if I have fail'd in doing justice to the subject, I shall not be much concern'd, since the subject is of such a nature, as to do Justice to itself. The Facts related in this Account are so important, and the Evidences of them so bright and glaring, that a bare representation of them (by how unequal a hand soever) must needs command the Esteem and Acknowledgment of every true English-man.

I do here therefore present Your Lordship with what few Men in
their

The Dedication.

their own case wou'd care to see,
but what Your Lordship can re-
flect upon with pleasure, A just and
impartial Narrative of Your own
Actions. Such I am sure I may
call the following Account: which,
defective as it is, Your Lordship
out of Your natural Candour and
Goodness will kindly accept from
one, who is neither asham'd nor
afraid to own himself,

Your Lordship's most oblig'd

and devoted Servant,

John Freind.

AN
ACCOUNT
 OF THE
Earl of Peterborow's
 Conduct in *S P A I N*,

Chiefly since the raising the
Siege of B A R C E L O N A,
1706.

IT was the constant Fate of
 the great Men of *Rome* and
Athens, who had been emi-
 nently serviceable to their Coun-
 try, to meet with very unsuitable
 Returns ; and to find their best
 Actions abroad, traduc'd and set
 in false Lights by malicious and
 B un-

2 *The E. of Peterborow's*

ungrateful Men at home, who reap'd the Benefit of them. This has been remarkably the Case of the Earl of *Peterborow*; whose important Services in *Spain*, for which he deserves a Statue from the Publick, have in a most Barbarous manner been mis-represented, and consequently misunderstood here in *England*.

Such groundless and ridiculous Reports as have been spread on this Occasion, cou'd never have gain'd the least Credit, had his Lordship's Friends been permitted to give the World an early Information of his Proceedings. But he was always extremely nice in that Point; and declar'd often, That if any Account of what had pass'd were necessary, he thought himself best able to give it, and wou'd not willingly be prevented by imperfect Relations
from

Conduct in Spain.

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from others. This silenc'd those who were otherwise well inclin'd to have done Justice to his Lordship's Character, and were furnish'd with ample Materials for that Purpose.

Nor did they, who had been all along Eye-witnesses of his Lordship's indefatigable Application and unparallel'd Successes, and had closely observ'd all the Steps of his Conduct, think it possible that the idle Reports given out to his Lordship's Disadvantage, shou'd have prevail'd so far, and made so deep an Impression in the Minds of Men, as they find they have done since their return to *England*.

My Lord Peterborow, looking back upon the great Advantages he had gain'd, and conscious of his own Integrity, was no ways apprehensive that he shou'd suf-

4 *The E. of Peterborow's*

fer in the Opinion of his Country-men. But at last, finding his mistake, gave his Friends leave to take all proper Ocasions of vindicating his Reputation, which has been attack'd with so great Injustice; and in order to it, put into their Hands several attested Copies of Instructions, Orders, and Letters, &c. with permission to make use of them, as they shou'd judge most for his Honour and Service.

I do therefore think my self at liberty to communicate some of these Papers to the World, and to accompany them with such Accounts of Things as my own Observation and Knowledge, and the frequent Opportunities I had of conversing with his Lordship, during my stay in *Spain*, have enabled me to give.

What

What Springs here in *England* gave motion to the new turn of Affairs in *Spain*, who were this noble Lord's Enemies, and upon what grounds, I think my self not concern'd to enquire. My Business is only to do Justice to such Actions, as want only to be understood, in order to be valued; and to shew my Gratitude to One who has in the highest manner oblig'd me. And I choose to do it in such Points where Right may be done to my Lord, without reflecting any Dishonour upon any other *English-man* whatever.

I have often heard my Lord profess with that generous freedom which distinguishes his Character, that he desir'd no Friend of his to embark in his Quarrels. And tho' I confess my Nature to be such, as to be wrought upon

the rather to engage for such a Declaration, yet my present Design will not lead me into any Disputes of that kind, were I never so much inclin'd to it. For the chief aim in this short Account, is to shew that his Lordship, after he found all the great Things he had done were not able to procure Credit to his Advice, but that it was determin'd to change Hands and Measures, yet still persisted to do every thing that became him, towards forwarding those Designs which he neither laid nor approv'd. And I think it will plainly appear from the course of this Relation, that nothing of that emulation and resentment, which his Lordship's Enemies objected to him, mix'd in his Conduct: Since he readily join'd and consulted with all that were in Command, after

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ter Matters were set upon a new Foot; and endeavour'd to Support the Publick Interest in other Hands, with more diligence and more hazards, if possible, than when the Army and Fleet were under his own Direction and Government.

The Truth of this must be own'd by the Ministers of the King of Spain, the Marquess *das Minas*, Lord *Galway*, and the Count *Noyailles*; with the last of which Generals my Lord *Peterborough* had an intire Correspondence in every Council and Consultation, from the time of the Count's coming into Spain, till he himself left it: Tho' some have been pleas'd to produce this very General always for an Instance, that his Lordship could agree with none that were in Command. And whatever was the

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occasion of the change of our Fortunes in *Spain*, that it was not owing in any respect to the Earl of *Peterborow*, I am so thoroughly convinc'd, and can make it so clear to the World, that, considering my Obligations to his Lordship, nothing can excuse me from doing it.

His Lordship's Qualifications for the great Enterprize he undertook, are too well known to be insisted on: They sufficiently appear from the Commissions with which he was entrusted; Commissions of as different a nature as Land and Sea, War and Peace, and which no Subject ever had yet at the same time. The only Thing I shall say more, is, That the Choice her Majesty made, was justify'd by the Event.

The

THE taking of *Barcelona* at first, and the preventing its being re-taken by the Enemy, were two Actions as Glorious in themselves, and of as great Consequences to the *Common Cause*, as any that have happened during this long and bloody War. The first of these was intirely and only owing to his Lordship's Personal Bravery and Conduct, nor had the latter been accomplish'd without it.

'Tis not within the compass of what I propose, to relate the swift Progress and surprizing Success of his Lordship's Arms; this is a matter in which the World needs no Information. I shall mention only two Particulars that have not been rightly understood, *viz.* The Siege and the Defence of *Barcelona*.

Tho' the Siege of this Place has justly made so great a Noise
Con-

in the World, yet the Motives and Conduct of it, as far as I can see, are little regarded, or perhaps known. His Lordship, upon Encamping before this City, found the Scene of Affairs quite otherwise, than what he was *promis'd* he shou'd meet with: Instead of 10000 Men in Arms to cover his Landing and strengthen his Camp, he saw only so many Higlers and Sutlers come into it; instead of a City in a weak condition and ready to Surrender upon the appearance of his Troops, he found an orderly Garrison in it, and a Force almost equal to his Army. In these Difficulties his Lordship, as he was oblig'd by his Instructions, call'd frequent Councils of War; wherein, Day after Day, for above a Fortnight together, it was often unanimously and always by a *Majority* agreed, That,
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considering the weakness of our Forces, and the strength of the Enemy; considering our Batteries, as the Engineers declar'd, wou'd be almost as long a raising, on the side of the Town we were Master's of, as the Fleet cou'd well stay: In short, considering the extreme Want of every thing necessary towards such an Attempt, the Siege was utterly impracticable. His Lordship indeed did twice give his Vote for the Undertaking; but from the following Councils of War 'twill appear, 'twas only out of the extreme Passion he had to comply with the King of *Spain's* Desires, and not out of any Opinion he had of succeeding.

At

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At a Council of War, consisting of General Officers, held on Board her Majesty's Ship the Britannia, off Barcelona, Aug. 16th, 1705.

P R E S E N T

*The Right Hon. the Earl of Peterborow,
Major General Connyngham.*

Major General Schratenbach.

The Right Hon. the Earl of Donnegal.

Brigadier P. de St. Amant.

The Right Hon. the Lord Vis. Charlemont.

Brigadier Richard Gorges.

Brigadier James Stanhope.

The Rt Hon. the Lord Viscount Shannon.

Col. Hans Hamilton Qu. Master General.

Colonel Charles Wills, Adjutant General.

AT a Council of War held on Board the *Britannia*, in Presence of his Catholick Majesty, it having been offer'd to our Consideration, whether the Siege of *Barcelona* ought to be undertaken, and the Opinions of every General

neral Officer having been asked, they are come to this unanimous Resolution: That the said Siege could not only not be undertaken with any probable hopes of Success, but that the attempting it, would expose our little Army to such Hazards and Difficulties, as might make our Retreat impracticable. The General Officers supported this their unannimous Vote, by the following Reasons.

First, That by the Account of the Prince of *Hesse*, which makes the Garrison least, it consists of above 3000 Foot, and 800 Horse; that of all other Accounts which came to us, either by Deferters, or the People of the Town who came to join us, and expressed the most earnest Desire that we should attack the Town, none made it less than 5000 Men, but most say six or seven. That our Army consists at this time of no more than seven thousand Men in Health, and fit for Service.

That the Works which we must attack are in very good Condition, but the Ground thro' which our Attack must be carried, is for the most part a Bogg, thro' which it will be impossible

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to March our Cannon, and where our Trenches must be fill'd with Water.

That the Engineers, whose Business it would be to manage this Siege, are so sensible of this Inconvenience, and the insuperable Difficulties which wou'd attend the regular Approach, that they gave up all thoughts of proceeding according to the usual Methods, and Forms of War; and if the Town is to be Attack'd, propose it may be by erecting a Battery of Cannon, at between 6 or 700 Paces distance from the Curtain, in which they propose to make a Breach, and when such a Breach is made to have it Storm'd.

This Project, which alone they think our little Number of Men can enable us to attempt, they confess will be liable to the following Difficulties.

That the Men who are to give the Assault, must March to it uncover'd about seven Hundred Paces, under the Fire of three Bastions, and of the cover'd Way, which they confess cannot by such a Battery be destroy'd, no more than the two Flanks, thro' which this Assault must be given. That the Enemy will probably plant Pallisadoes in the Ditch, which we shall never come

to

to see with our Cannon; so that our Men to carry the Town by Storm, will be under a Necessity of gaining the cover'd Way, cutting down the Pallisadoes, and mounting the Breach at one time, under the Fire already mention'd.

For the working at this Battery, carrying Fascines for it, bringing up the Cannon and Ammunition, so great a number of Workmen are necessary, as cannot be spar'd by our little Army, tho' no Guard were to be mounted to support this Battery. That of our Dragoon-Horses, from which some Assistance might have been hop'd for this Service, not one Hundred and Twenty are in a Condition to go. That if, by the Assistance of some Seamen, and of some of the Country People, our Battery might be put in a Condition to make a Breach, we have great Reason to believe, that before we can be ready to give an Assault, the Garrison may be considerably Reinforc'd both from *Madrid*, where we know they have a thousand or twelve hundred Horse; and from the Frontiers of *France*, which are but 35 Leagues distant; and 'tis well known an Army five times as strong as ours, would not be sufficient to invest
the

16 *The E. of Peterborow's*

the Place, and to prevent Succours going in.

That if our whole Army, which we must expect to be considerably diminished in three Weeks time, should in such Circumstances resolve to Attack an equal number of regular Troops, under the Difficulties already mention'd, and should be repuls'd, which is most probable, it would in such a Case be found Impracticable, not only to draw off our Cannon, but even to carry off the remainder of our Men, who would be pushed not only by the regular Troops, but even by those, who finding themselves desperate, by having join'd us, would in all Probability be very glad to make their Peace at Home by assisting to destroy us.

That tho' bold, and almost desperate Attempts, have sometimes been undertaken with Success, yet are they never by Choice, but the effect of Despair, and to get out of some great Difficulty; whereas these Troops are at this Time under no Necessity, which obliges them to desperate Attempts, since other very considerable Services, and such as by Her Majesty's Instructions seem to be thought at least of equal Importance
with

with this of *Barcelona*, may still be pursued: Such is particularly that of *Italy*, and supporting the Duke of *Savoy*. The Earl of *Peterborow* has likewise propos'd and offer'd to his Majesty to March by Land, along the Sea Coast, where, with the Countenance and Assistance of the Fleet, many Towns of Consequence might be reduc'd, the whole Country disposed to declare for, and pay Obedience to his Catholick Majesty, as some part of the Neighbouring Parts have already done; and upon any reasonable Encouragement from this Province, and those of *Valentia* and *Arragon*, Winter-Quarters may be secur'd, and a Body of Troops rais'd out of them, which might enable his Majesty to March to *Madrid* next Spring.

Either of these Services we do most chearfully offer to go upon, or indeed any other which may be propos'd by his Majesty, which shall not expose both the Honour of the *Queen's* and *States-General's* Arms, and the Body of the Troops, which we are intrusted with, to utter Destruction.

A true Copy

C

per *A. Furlly*.

At a Council of War, consisting of General Officers, held at Major General Schratenbach's Quarters, in the Camp before Barcelona, Aug. the 22d, 1705.

P R E S E N T

*The Right Hon. the Earl of Peterborow.
Major General Connyngham.
Major General Schratenbach.
The Right Hon. the Earl of Donnegal.
Brigadier P. de St. Amant.
The Right Hon. the Lord Vis. Charlemont.
Brigadier Richard Gorges.
Brigadier James Stanhope.
The Rt. Hon. the Lord Viscount Shannon.
Col. Hans Hamilton Qu. Master General.
Colonel Charles Wills, Adjutant General.*

HAVING well weighed and debated the King of Spain's two Letters dated of this Day, and upon a second Consideration (as his Majesty desir'd)
of

of his Speech on board the *Britannia*, and well examined all our Circumstances, and those of the Garrison :

It is propos'd to this Council of War to give their Votes, whether a real and vigorous Attack on this Place, by erecting a Battery of fifty Pieces of Cannon against the Courtain, in order to the bringing on the speediest Assault possible on the Breach, shall be undertaken, or can be made with hopes of Success? Which pass'd in the Negative.

Hen. Connyngham.

Richard Gorges

Charles Wills.

Shannon.

P. de St. Amant.

Charlemont.

Donnegal.

B. de Schratenbach.

James Stanhope

H. Hamilton

The Earl of *Peterborow* gave his Vote in the Affirmative, for the following Reasons.

Peterborow.

Because I am sensible that the Queen my Mistress, besides the Engagements of Treaties, and the Motives of publick Interest, has a most particular and tender Friendship for the King of *Spain*;

therefore, as I think it Expedient to pay him the utmost Respect, in complying as far as possible with his Desires, in any Attempt wherein there is the least hopes of Success, after having, as in Duty bound, with all Sincerity and Plainness represented to him the Difficulties and Hazards to which he exposes his Interest, and the Troops of the Queen and her Allies.

Because that his Majesty persisting with so much firmness in his Opinion about *Barcelona*, upon a belief the Town would surrender if a Breach was made: This may create some Dispute in the World, what might have been the Event, which nothing but Experience can demonstrate, what-ever Reasons some may have to judge the contrary, and it may be thought by some our Duty to have tried the Experiment, tho' at the greatest hazard.

Lastly, because no other Reason but plain disobedience to her Majesty's Orders, should have hindred me from complying with any Commands, that came from his Catholick Majesty. But the Queen has repeatedly commanded me, in all my Instructions, to be guided in Councils of War by a Majority, even
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in exprefs Words, in thofe Cafes where the Kings of *Spain* and *Portugal* or their Minifters fhould offer any thing in Writing to me; which Orders I communicated to his Catholick Majefty, as all my other Inftuctions, and I had often opportunity of repeating them before the Minifters of the King of *Spain*, the King of *Portugal*, and the *Engliſh* and *Dutch* Ambaſſador and Envoy. Being thus fetter'd by ſuch positive Orders, which I muſt comply with, this has again made me offer the Kings Propoſals about *Barcelona*, and uſe my utmoſt Efforts to gain the conſent of a Council of War, declaring then, as I do now, that I would moſt willingly engage in any attempt which could have been agreed to in a Council of War, having received his Majeſty aboard the Fleet, with a Reſolution to ſerve and obey him in all things in my Power.

per A. Furlly.

*At a Council of War, Au-
gust 25th, 1705.*

I Am of Opinion that attacking of
Barcelona for eighteen Days is
throwing away Time and the Troops,
and therefore give my Vote against it.

Hans Hamilton.

I cannot agree with the Kings Propo-
sal in Attacking *Barcelona* for eighteen
Days, for that I think is to besiege the
Place in Form, and I have already giv-
en my Opinion to the contrary in Wri-
ting.

Shannon.

I am of the same Opinion

Charlemont.

*Rich. Gorges.
Charles Wills.*

*Je subsignè Je suis d' Opinion d' accorder
ce que sa Majeste Souhaite, pour les dix
huit Jours qu' on travailleroit d' attaquer
Barcelone le 5 de Sept. 1705.*

P. de St. Amant.

I

Conduct in Spain. 23

I am of Opinion to agree with the Kings desire for carrying on the Attack against *Barcelona* for eighteen Days.

P. de St Amant.

I suis du meme Sentiment.

James Stanhope.

I am of the same Opinion.

James Stanhope.

Whether the Siege of *Barcelona* shall be undertaken or no,

I give my Vote in the Affirmative.

Peterborow.

I am of Opinion that the Siege of *Barcelona* ought not to be undertaken, for the Reasons I have already sign'd to, and that the Armies remaining here eighteen Days, may make a good Retreat Impracticable, or at least so far waste the Army and Time, as to render all other Attempts impossible; but am ready to obey all such Orders, as

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I shall receive from my superiour Officers.

August 25th
1705.

*Hen. Connyngham.
Donnegal.*

Je me tiens a mes premiers Advis de ne point s'attacher à la Place de Barcelone, voyant que c'est une Chose impossible de reussir ayant besoin le 18 Jours que sa Majestè soubaite pour commencer, et que je ne hassardera pas les Troupes de leur Haute Puissances; Mais si my Ld. Peterborow me l'ordonne de son Chef, Je m'y trouverois au Camp devant Barcelone. Ce Sept. 5 1705.

W. Baron de Schratenbach.

I continue in my former Opinion against Attacking *Barcelona*; thinking it impossible to succeed, since the time of 18 Days, which his Majesty desires, is barely sufficient to begin the Siege; and I will not hazard the Troops of the States. But if my Lord *Peterborow* will take it upon himself, I will assist him in it.

W. Baròn de Schratenbach.

per A. Furlly.

At a Council of War, consisting of General Officers, held at the Earl of Peterborow's Quarters in the Camp before Barcelona, Aug. 26th O. S. 1705.

P R E S E N T

The Right Hon. the Earl of Peterborow.

Major General Connyngnam.

Major General Schratenbach.

The Right Hon. the Earl of Donnegal.

Brigadier P. de St. Amant.

The Right Hon. the Lord Vis. Charlemont.

Brigadier Richard Gorges.

Brigadier James Stanhope.

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Viscount Shannon.

Col. Hans Hamilton Qu. Master General.

Collonel Charles Wills, Adjutant General.

Since the King of *Spain* is resolved to lay the whole Stress of his Affairs upon making an Attempt on *Barcelona* for eighteen Days (specifi'd in his

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his Letter to us) notwithstanding all our unanswerable Arguments to the contrary at three several Councils of War, and tho' we have Reason to fear the Result will too much justify our Opinions, yet in regard that our General, the Earl of *Peterborow*, has comply'd with the Kings Desire, as likewise the Brigadiers *St. Amant*, and *Stanhope*, and that we are extreemly pressed to do the same by the King and his Ministers, who still continue to give positive assurance of their Intelligence from the Place, being resolved that no blame be imputed to us :

We are willing to comply with the Kings Desire for the abovemention'd Attempts; tho' at the same time we must express our Concern, that this Undertake will debar us of all future Services for this Campaign.

It is evident to this Council of War, by the Demands from the Engineers, and the Opinions of all the General Officers, that this attempt cannot be made with less than five thousand Men on Duty every Day, to Work and Guard the Trenches; that of this Number our Army, not exceeding seven thousand Men, including the eleven hundred *Marines*,

rines, besides the Dragoons and Guards, cannot furnish above two thousand five hundred; that this Service absolutely requires two thousand five hundred Men daily out of the Fleet and *Miquelets*, and we desire the Admirals (having promis'd their utmost Assistance) to let us know whether they can furnish fifteen hundred Men *per* Day. And whereas they have promis'd to assist this undertaking with fifty two Battering Guns, it is understood all things thereunto belonging must be furnished with the Gunners and Men.

per A. Furly.

At a Council of War, consisting of General Officers, held at Major General Connyngham's Quarters in the Camp before Barcelona, Aug. 28. 1705.

P R E S E N T

*The Right Hon. the Earl of Peterborow.
Major General Connyngham.
Major General Schratenbach.
The Right Hon. the Earl of Donnegal.
Brigadier P. de St. Amant.
The Right Hon. the Lord Vis. Charlemont.
Brigadier Richard Gorges.
Brigadier James Stanhope.
The Right Hon. the Lord Visc. Shannon.
Col. Hans Hamilton Qu. Master General.
Collonel Charles Wills, Adjutant General.*

HAVING overcome the highest Difficulties in submitting our Judgments, declar'd in three Councils of War, supported with undeniable Reasons

sons, to His Majesty's Pleasure, and the Inclinations of our General, provided we had been assisted as in the last Council of War we desir'd, we are confident His Majesty will allow we gave even a most unreasonable mark of our Respect, having consented to expose the Troops under our Care to visible Ruin, without any prospect of Success, and against all the Rules of War.

We have been delay'd by Disappointments in all we were made to expect, wanting Men and Time to carry on the Siege, and diverted by several Resolutions intimated from His Majesty, sometimes for a March, sometimes for a Siege, so little provided with Intelligence from the Place, that we were oblig'd to Land the Forces without the least Advice, and that made an Argument for an Attempt against a Town, with a Garrison near as strong as our selves, without any Correspondence in it suitable to what has been told, which Siege must require more than two third parts of our Men on Duty every Day, by the demand of our Engineers.

And having notice from Admiral *Wassanaer* of the positive time of the departure of the *Dutch* Ships, some Days before

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before which the *Dutch* General assures us he will embarque his Troops, and the Engineers not undertaking to make a Battery even in that time, since the Fleet, besides the Marines, which in all our Computations of the Strength of the Army, we had reckon'd upon to compose a part of it, are not able to furnish towards carrying on our Works above nine hundred Men, of which, only three hundred can work each Day, instead of 1500 for daily Service, as we had desir'd; so that the whole assistance that the Fleet can give, being added to the number of effective Foot we have now fit for Service, including the Battalion of Guards, will make in all but 8515 Men, out of which 5000 Men must be daily employ'd, either to work at or guard the intended Trenches and Battery.

And, since eight Deputies of the *Catalans* did declare to the Earl of *Peterborow*, that they would not promise any number of Men to work at our Trenches and Batteries, or in any Place where they shou'd be expos'd to Fire, which they said cou'd not be expected from undisciplin'd Country-People :

And,

And, whereas we express'd in our last Council of War, that our highest Concern was, that we should be disabled from pursuing any other real Service, by staying to endeavour to make a fruitless Attempt:

And, seeing our general Instructions are explained, and the first Services intended so plainly directed anew in several Letters signifying Her Majesty's Pleasure: It is the unanimous Opinion of this Council of War that the propos'd Attempt on *Barcelona* for eighteen Days cannot be made, but that the Forces be immediately imbarqu'd for the probable Service, and the Support of the Duke of *Savoy*.

per A. Furly.

At

Thus we see it was resolv'd to embarque all the troops for *Savoy*, which indeed was the first design of his Lordship's Expedition. But the King of *Spain* taking a sudden resolution to stay by his *Catalans*, his Lordship saw himself reduc'd to this *Dilemma*, either to go Home without attempting any thing, or take this attempt upon himself, contrary to the opinion of the General Officers and consequently to positive Instructions. His Lordship, who never car'd for being a General without doing something, chose rather to trust to the good nature of his Country, which he hop'd wou'd pardon his succeeding in so considerable an Action, tho' not strictly undertaken by a formal order. My Lord therefore now made use only of his own thoughts; and by
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an uncommon artifice made that never to be forgotten attack upon fort *Monjuick*, the very foundation of all our footing in *Spain*. This, I know, some wou'd attribute to the late Prince of *Hesse*: That brave Prince indeed had too great a share in the danger of this undertaking; but as he had no Command in the Army, so he was not in the least concern'd in the forming of this Design.

Those that remember matters of fact so well known in foreign Parts and to so many thousand then present, cannot but read with surprize in *Annals* p. 146. year the 4th. of Her Majesty's Reign, taken (as is pretended) from papers of publick authority, representations so false and so injurious to the reputation of this Noble Lord: As if a diminution of his indis-

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34 *The E. of Peterborow's*

putable services were to be the only reward of such hazards run, and such successes obtain'd for the publick.

The injudicious, or rather impossible, proposals made by the Prince of *Hesse*, and insisted upon by him to the last, were the occasion of those unanimous Councils of War against an enterprize which promis'd such certain ruin : and the freedoms taken in discourse by that Prince had prevented any correspondence, for some time, between him and the Earl of *Peterborow*. So far was this Project against *Monnick* from being propos'd by that Prince to his Lordship, that in truth the Earl of *Peterborow* was forc'd to make it a secret even to the Court ; where resentments were very publick and remarkable, upon orders

orders to embarque the artillery and the King's baggage, which his Lordship gave out the better to disguise his real design. Nay, the excuse the Earl of *Peterborough* made to the Prince of *Hesse*, for inviting him to assist in an action he cou'd not yet acquaint him with, was, that the indispensable necessity of deceiving the Enemy had made him resolve to surprize his Friends in an attempt, which however desperate, was yet the only possible way of carrying on the Siege with success. All I shall observe further upon this Head is, That 'twas own'd by all who were there, that had not his Lordship shewn an unexampled Vigour and Courage, and expos'd himself more than perhaps became one in his Post, the Efforts of the Enemy and the *mistakes* of some of his

own people had put this important enterprize beyond all retrieve. So that 'twill be the least justice that can be done to his Lordship on this occasion to say, That few Generals cou'd have accomplish'd what he did, and that fewer, considering his circumstances, wou'd have attempted it.

They who were so ready to attribute the Honour of taking *Barcelona* to any rather than to the Earl of *Peterborow*, wou'd with equal justice deny his Lordship to have had any share in the relief of it, imputing the intire preservation of that place to the timely arrival of the Fleet. This no doubt was very seasonable and fortunate, and what his Lordship was indefatigably industrious in hastning: But considering that the Enemy had for

two days before this made a practicable Breach, let any unprejudic'd man judge, whether the appearance of our Fleet upon the Coast, cou'd be the only reason of preventing their assault; nay, rather, whether it was not a reason for them to attack the Town, as they might easily have done, with more vigour and dispatch. The Terror must come from some other quarter: And I think we may very impartially assign it to my Lord *Peterborough's* being posted in the Mountains with a few Troops of his own, and a good number of *Miquelets*; which his Lordship dispos'd of to that advantage, as to cut off the Enemy from any communication with the Country, hinder all their parties from sallying out, and give them continual alarms and uneasiness.

38 *The E. of Peterborow's*
easiness in their Camp. If they
had made an Attack upon the
Town, they had good reason to
fear they might be Attack'd
themselves at the same time from
the Mountains: And they were
unwilling to venture the disor-
ders that might have happened
to their Army, which they de-
sign'd for other Services as too
plainly appear'd soon after. It
must be confess'd, that my Lord
had but a very few regular
Troops with him: But those
who have had a thousand oppor-
tunities of being acquainted with
his dexterity in surprizing, and
his peculiar Art of managing
weak Instruments to elude and
confound the force of a strong
Enemy, will easily be convinc'd
that the Appearance he made
and the Alarms he gave from the
hills, was not the effect of Chance
and

and Hurry, but the pure result of a good Conduct: And that to his unwearied Vigilance and uncommon Stratagems, we owe, in a great measure, the Infatuation our Enemies were then possess'd with.

Perhaps it may be no disagreeable entertainment to the Reader, if I shou'd make a short comparison of these two Sieges of *Barcelona*: The Actions being both of 'em extreamly remarkable for the difference not only of the Event, but of the circumstances the Armies were in when they enter'd upon the Siege, and of the Methods which they us'd in carrying it on.

When it was attack'd by Her Majesty's Arms, the Success was every where despair'd of; and the Attempt oppos'd by many Councils of War: nor without

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reason,

reason, since the Garrison was double our number in Horse, and almost equal in Foot; And the *English* Army, unprovided of Artillery and all things else which are thought necessary where a Siege is in good earnest intended, was in a manner supply'd with nothing but from our Fleet.

But when the *French* attack'd it, they had a Royal Army, encourag'd by the presence of a King, led by a Mareschal of *France*, and countenanc'd by the Fleet under the command of the Lord High Admiral. The Success was presum'd certain all over the World, and insur'd by the most famous Engineer of *France*; not without very good grounds, for their preparations of all kinds were equal to such hopes. Their Army was numerous, not less than 24000, their

their Troops in good condition, and the quantity of Warlike Stores with which they were furnisht for that Siege, almost incredible. We may judge of the rest by the Artillery they left behind 'em upon their Retreat, which was upwards of 100 Brass Canon fit for Battery, and mounted upon the proper Field-Carriages.

The circumstances of the two Armies that severally sat down before this place being so unlike, the Methods by which they attack'd it must needs be very different. The very Works thrown up by the *French* wou'd have destroy'd the Earl of *Peterborough's* Army in labour and fatigue alone. For they begun their Trenches from the bottom of *Monjuick-hill* at the distance of twice Musket-shot, and continued

42 *The E. of Peterborow's*
tinued 23 days battering the
Fort with 50 pieces of Cannon,
and lost 3000 of their best men
in taking that Citadel, which the
Earl of *Peterborow* secur'd with
little loss in less than an hour.
And besides these Works at *Mon-*
juick, they carried on their In-
trenchments to a vast length,
all along the West-side of the
Town; and finish'd them with
such regularity and exactness, as
if they had design'd to secure
them against the insults of the
strongest Army.

When the *English* besieg'd the
City, they were scarce more than
7000 in number, and 'twas ne-
cessary that even this little Body
shou'd be divided into two Camps,
so situated as not to be able to
relieve one another under three
Leagues march, round by the
foot of the mountains: so that
the

the Garrison had double the Force of either part of our Army. This was the only contrivance by which the sitting down of such a handful of men, not capable of surrounding the Town, cou'd have had the effect of a regular Investment.

The disposition of these two small Bodies was thus happily order'd: That on one side in the plain was cover'd by a Fort just on the edge of the Sea, and great retrenchments were carried on to a little Village, where the walls of some Gardens and a River gave security to the right of the Camp; and the Waters upon occasion might be made use of to render the flat Grounds between them and *Barcelona* almost unpassable. That on the other side was plac'd in a little Valley betwixt Hills

so

44 *The E. of Peterborow's*

so conveniently, and out of sight, that tho' within small-shot of the walls, the Enemy cou'd only incommode us by the random-shot of their *Biscayne* musquets. The Works leading from the little Camp betwixt the Mountains to the Battery were so inconsiderable, that two High-ways supplied almost the use of Trenches; which were reliev'd with those different faints and disguises, that we lost very few Men in changing the Guards.

To conclude, the day before the Capitulation the whole Army had orders for a general Attack, and no one Man was exempt from his share in that hazardous action: Tho' the Garrison, upon a view of this desperate resolution, prevented it by an immediate surrender.

All

All *Europe* wonder'd at this Event, and what opinion they, who were the nearest Witnesses and most concern'd in the consequences of it, had of my Lord's Bravery and Conduct; may appear by the following Letter of his *Catholick* Majesty; a Letter, which I take leave to Reprint here, since it is not more remarkable for the matter of it, than for being so soon forgotten.

Great News with many Successes
 As well because this happy Success
 The Effect of your Arms always glorious
 As in the purest manner of that
 Dour and eternal Affection you
 Have for me, and for every thing which
 May contribute to the advancement

of my Interest.
 I must do this Justice to all the Officers and Common Soldiers, and particularly to my Lord, that he has shewn in this whole Expedition, a constant Bravery and Conduct, worthy of the choice that your Majesty has made of him, and that he could
 no

King

*King Charles's Letter to the
Queen of Great Britain.**Madam my Sister,*

' I Should not have been so long e'er
 ' I did my self the Honour to re-
 ' peat the assurances of my sincere Re-
 ' spects to you, had not I waited for the
 ' good Occasion which I now acquaint
 ' you with, that the City of *Barcelona*
 ' is surrendred to me by Capitulation.
 ' I doubt not but you will receive this
 ' great News with intire Satisfaction;
 ' as well because this happy Success is
 ' the effect of your Arms always glori-
 ' ous, as from the pure motives of that
 ' Bounty and Paternal Affection you
 ' have for me, and for every thing which
 ' may contribute to the advancement
 ' of my Interest.

' I must do this Justice to all the Of-
 ' ficers and Common Souldiers, and par-
 ' ticularly to my Lord *Peterborow*, that
 ' he has shewn in this whole Expediti-
 ' on a Constancy, Bravery and Conduct
 ' worthy of the choice that your Maje-
 ' sty has made of him, and that he could

no

'no ways give me better Satisfaction
 'than he has by the great Zeal and Ap-
 'plication which he has equally testifi-
 'ed for my Interest, and for the Service
 'of my Person. I owe the same justice
 'to Brigadier *Stanhope* for his great Zeal,
 'Vigilance, and very wise Conduct,
 'which he has given proofs of upon all
 'Occasions: As also to all your Officers
 'of the Fleet, particularly to your wor-
 'thy Admiral *Shovel*, assuring your Ma-
 'jesty, that he has assisted me in this
 'Expedition with an inconceivable
 'Readiness and Application, and that
 'no Admiral will be ever better able to
 'render me greater Satisfaction than he
 'has done. During the Siege of *Barce-*
 '*lona* some of your Majesty's Ships,
 'with the assistance of the Troops of
 'the Country have reduced the Town
 'of *Tarragona*, and the Officers are
 'made Prisoners of War. The Town
 'of *Girone* has been taken at the same
 'time by surprize by the Troops of the
 'Country. The Town of *Lerida* has
 'submitted, as also that of *Tortosa* upon
 'the *Ebro*; so that we have taken all the
 'Places of *Catalonia*, except *Roses*. Some
 'Places in *Arragon* near *Sarragossa* have
 'declar'd for me, and the Garrison of
 'the

48 *The E. of Peterborow's*

' the Castle of *Denia* in *Valentia* have
' maintain'd their Post, and repuls'd the
' Enemy; 400 of the Enemies Cavalry
' have entred into our Service, and a
' great number of their Infantry have
' deserted.

' This, Madam, is the State that your
' Arms, and the inclination of the Peo-
' ple have put my Affairs in. It is un-
' necessary to tell you what stops the
' course of these Conquests; it is not the
' Season of the Year, nor the Enemy,
' these are no obstacles to your Troops,
' who desire nothing more than to act
' under the Conduct that your Majesty
' has appointed them. The taking of
' *Barcelona* with so small a number of
' Troops is very remarkable, and what
' has been done in this Siege is almost
' without example. That with 7 or
' 8000 Men of your Troops, and 2000
' Miquelets, we should surround and in-
' vest a Place, that 30000 *French* could
' not block up.

' After a March of 13 hours, the
' Troops climb'd up the Rocks and Pre-
' cipices to attack a Fortification strong-
' er than the Place, which the Earl of
' *Peterborow* has sent you a Plan of. Two
' Generals with the Granadiers attack'd

' it

' it Sword in Hand, in which Action
 ' the Prince of *Hesse* died gloriously after
 ' so many brave Actions: I hope his Bro-
 ' ther and his Family will always have
 ' your Majesty's Protection. With 800
 ' Men they forc'd the Cover'd Way,
 ' and all the Intrenchments and Works,
 ' one after another, till they came to
 ' the last Work which surrounded it,
 ' against 500 Men of regular Troops
 ' which defended the Place, and a Re-
 ' inforcement they had receiv'd; and
 ' three Days afterwards we became
 ' Masters of the Place. We afterwards
 ' attack'd the Town on the side of the
 ' Castle. We landed again our Cannon
 ' and the other Artillery with inconceiv-
 ' able Trouble, and form'd two Camps
 ' distant from each other three Leagues;
 ' against a Garrison almost as numerous
 ' as our Army, whose Cavalry was dou-
 ' ble the strength of ours. The first
 ' Camp was so well intrench'd that
 ' 'twas defended by 2000 Men and the
 ' Dragoons, whilst we attack'd the Town
 ' with the rest of our Troops. The
 ' Breach being made we prepar'd to
 ' make a general Assault with all the
 ' Army: These are Circumstances,
 ' E Madam,

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Madam, which distinguish this Action
perhaps from all others.

Here has happen'd an unforeseen
Accident. The Cruelty of the pretended
Viceroy, and the report spread abroad,
that he would take away the Prisoners
contrary to the Capitulation, provok'd
the Burghers and some of the Country
People to take up Arms against the
Garrison, whilst they were busie in
packing up their Baggage, which was
to be sent away the next day; so that
every thing tended to Slaughter; but
your Majesty's Troops entering into
the Town with the Earl of *Peterborow*
instead of seeking Pillage, a practice
common upon such Occasions, they ap-
peas'd the Tumult, and have sav'd the
Town, and even the Lives of their
Enemies, with a Discipline and Gene-
rosity without example.

What remains is, that I return you
my most hearty Thanks for sending
so great a Fleet, and such good and
valiant Troops to my Assistance. Af-
ter so happy a beginning I have
thought it proper, according to the
Sentiments of your Generals and Ad-
mirals, to support by my Presence the
Conquests that we have made, and to
show

' show my Subjects, so Affectionate to
 ' my Person, that I cannot abandon
 ' them. I receive such Succours from
 ' your Majesty and from your Generous
 ' Nation, that I am loaded with your
 ' Bounties, and am not a little con-
 ' cern'd to think, that the support of
 ' my Interest should cause so great an
 ' expence. But, Madam, I sacrifice
 ' my Person, and my Subjects in *Cata-*
 ' *lonia* expose also their Lives and For-
 ' tunes upon the assurances they have of
 ' your Majesty's generous Protection.
 ' Your Majesty and your Council
 ' knows better than we do what is
 ' necessary for our Conservation. We
 ' shall then expect your Majesty's Suc-
 ' cours with an intire Confidence in
 ' your Bounty and Wisdom. A fur-
 ' ther force is necessary: we give no
 ' small diversion to *France*, and with-
 ' out doubt they will make their ut-
 ' most Efforts against me as soon as
 ' possible; but I am satisfied, that
 ' the same Efforts will be made by
 ' my Allies to defend me. Your Good-
 ' ness, Madam, inclines you, and your
 ' Power enables you, to support those
 ' that the Tyranny of *France*
 ' would oppress. All that I can infi-

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'nuate to your Wisdom and that of
'your Allies, is, that the Forces em-
'ploy'd in this Country will not be
'unprofitable to the publick Good, but
'will be under an Obligation and Necessi-
'ty to act with the utmost Vigour
'against the Enemy. I am,

*With an inviolable Affection, Respect,
and most sincere Acknowledgment,*

*From the Camp at
Senia before Bar-
celona, the 22d
of October, 1705.*

Madam, my Sister,

Your most Affectionate

Brother,

CHARLES.

If

If we go on now to consider the relief of *Barcelona*, we shall find the Earl of *Peterborough's* conduct as steady, as it was in the taking it, and perhaps as little understood. For in this, as in most of the Events of this War, his Lordship overcame all the Obstacles that cou'd be thrown in his way by the Ministers of the *Spanish* Court. As soon as his Lordship perceiv'd that the Enemies Design was upon *Barcelona*, he order'd some of the Troops in *Lerida* to march and reinforcethat Garrison: The King, who was perswaded they wou'd rather make an Attempt upon *Lerida*, countermanded those Orders of my Lord, and was so little apprehensive of *Barcelona's* being in danger, tho' sufficiently warn'd of it by Letters from his Lordship, that when

the Enemy was within 5 Leagues of the Town, his Majesty had but 500 Men in it. My Lord, in like manner, was solicited by the Court to abandon *Vatencia*, in order to secure *Catalonia*, and by the most pressing Letters and Commands, he was urg'd to such rash and impossible Attempts, as must have prov'd the certain ruin of the Forces under his Command, and the loss of the King's Person. But in all these distracting and desperate Cases, his Lordship not only took the proper Resolutions, but with a Prudence fortunate to himself, as well as the Publick, never omitted to secure the unanimous Consent of all in Councils of War, and gave in Writing beforehand the Reasons which never fail'd of being justify'd by the Events.

While

While *Barcelona* was encompass'd by Land and Sea (after the loss of *Fort Monjuick*) his Lordship found methods to fling 500 Men into the Town, which was thought humanely impossible: And he brought the Forces which so much contributed to the relief of the City, without abandoning *Valencia*, or any foot of Ground that he had gain'd in *Spain*. He maintain'd his Post upon the Hills, for near a Fortnight, with about 2500 Men, never above a League or two from the Enemy; which he kept in perpetual Alarms. And by the constant Vigilance he us'd, and the exact Intelligences he procur'd, he continued in the Neighbourhood of such an Army to the last; till he made a March of about seven Leagues with so critical a Disposition,

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that all his Foot came in a Fleet of Boats he had prepar'd to the number of 3 or 400, and landed at the same time with the Troops that were on board the Navy.

The throwing in of so seasonable a Reinforcement into *Barcelona*, under such circumstances, was as great a Disgrace as happened to the *French*, except that of their rising from before the Town immediately after; for the Garrison, even with this addition, was not stronger than when my Lord *Peterborow* took it with little more than a third part of their Army. In order to secure this great advantage, when it shou'd happen, the Earl of *Peterborow*, notwithstanding all the haste made from *Valencia* to *Barcelona*, had visited, fortify'd and secur'd all the Passes behind him, so as to oblige (with an inconsiderable

derable number of regular Troops and the Country-People) the whole Army of Mareschal de Tesse intirely to abandon Spain : into which, had my Lord's Advice been follow'd, they had never to this Day return'd, as I shall presently shew. Nothing will appear more wonderful, if People wou'd impartially consider it, than how it was possible for the Earl of *Peterborough*, with about 8000 Men (for he never had more) to gain ground, and defend every Inch of it, against thirty thousand as good Troops as any in *Europe*, and at last to disperse and drive them out of the *Spanish* Dominions. Those that have been too willing to find imaginary Faults, and that cou'd not deny some notorious Services of his Lordship, have however represented these Actions as effects

effects of Spirit and a happy Temerity; but such effects of lucky Chance and Courage seldom produce above one fortunate Event, and are too often paid for by an after-reckoning. Whereas the whole War, while the Earl of Peterborow had the Conduct of it, seem'd nothing but a course of prodigious Success, without one disappointment or loss by Land or Sea: And every Action argued before-hand with all his Officers, and the Reasons upon all great Emergencies set down in Councils of War, prove that Fortune had little share in such constant, regular, and foreseen Events; and that his Lordship was Prudent enough to provide against the evil hour, both Abroad and at Home.

I have dwelt longer upon these particulars relating to *Barcelona*,
than

than I at first intended; and shall now go on to what I chiefly aim'd at in these papers.

The Siege being rais'd, and the Enemy advanc'd into *Rosillon*, his Lordship clearly foresaw what designs they had to put in execution towards the recovery of *Spain*: and therefore he immediately made all the pressing instances to the King and Court to hasten their departure from *Barcelona*, and to use the utmost dispatch to get possession of *Madrid*; for it was beyond all contradiction that the King's presence at his Capital wou'd have made all the chief places in his Dominions declare for him; and an ordinary force upon the frontier of *Navar* wou'd have secur'd the passes there against any second entrance of the *French* into *Spain*. These motives and arguments

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ments urg'd by my Lord had their proper weight with the Court and the Army: and accordingly it was unanimously twice resolv'd, in a general Council of War, by all the Ministers and Officers, that the King should with all diligence imaginable march towards *Valencia*; and that my Lord *Peterborow* with 6000 Men shou'd go thither before, and prepare every thing, in order to carry on his Majesty to *Madrid*.

At

*At a Council of War, held in
the Presence of his Catho-
lick Majesty in Barcelona,
May 18th, 1706.*

P R E S E N T

The KING.

Ambassadour of Portugal.

Earl of Peterborow.

Prince Anthony Lichstenstein

Count Noyailles Marshal de Camp.

Count Ulstelt Marshal de Camp.

Admiral Leake.

Admiral Wassenner.

Lieutenant-General Windham.

Prince Henry Landgrave of Hesse.

Paul Methwin, Esq; Envoy to Savoy.

Mitford Crowe, Esq;

Brigadier Stanhope.

Admiral Bing.

Admiral Jennings.

Don Francisco Zinzerling.

HIS Majesty having propos'd, that
seeing God was pleased to bless
his Arms with such Success, and it be-
ing

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ing necessary to pursue the Advantage before the Enemy should have time to gather fresh Forces; he had called together the Persons present in Council, to deliberate with them about the most important Operations, and the easiest Method of putting them in Execution: desiring all their Opinions in a Matter of so great Consequence, as likewise in the following Proposals.

1. ' Whether the War shall be carried on in the Kingdom of *Arragon*, or *Valencia*.
2. ' Which and what Troops ought to be employed in the Campaign, and what will be sufficient to leave in *Catalonia* for its defence.
3. ' What Train of Artillery is proper, and how the Baggage is to be regulated.
4. ' How and what Places will be most proper for Magazines.
5. ' What Operations may be pitcht upon with hopes of Success.
6. ' Where his Majesty shall be.
7. ' Where the Army shall Rendezvous.

His

His Majesty concluding with expressions of his Confidence in the known Valour and Application of all the Generals, by whose Conduct he expected a most advantageous Progress to the *Common Cause*.

I. Admiral *Leake* declared, that the dispositions for the Operations of the Fleet, were of a different Nature from those by Land, but that he assur'd in the Name of the rest, that they would comply with their Obligations and Services to his Majesty, to the utmost of their Power, in what belong'd to the Sea Service; and having shown his Majesty their Opinions in a Council of War held on Board, he referr'd himself to that as his Sentiment, seeing no reason to alter his Opinion.

His Majesty having heard the discourse of every one, it was the unanimous Opinion of all, That considering the present circumstances of Affairs, it would be best to carry on the Operations in the Kingdom of *Valencia*, where we should not only enjoy the Advantage of the assistance of the Fleet, which would save great Expences, and Troubles, which the Army would be liable to in a March to *Arragon*; there being
no

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no other Body in *Spain*, that could embarrass the speedy Conquest of that Kingdom, but that small one of the Count *de las Torres*: Routing this, the Kingdom of *Valencia* would be free, *Murcia* would submit, and the most convenient way would be open to proceed with the Army towards the Capital of *Madrid*, besides the Advantages gotten by inclining towards the *Portuguese* Army, being able to resist any Force the *French* can make, in order to hinder the entire Conquest of the Continent of *Spain*.

2. As to the second Point: It being of the highest consequence to preserve this Principality from the Insults, and the Invasions of the Enemy, leaving to this end a considerable Garrison in *Girona*; altho' it is thought that the Enemy is not in a Condition to besiege any other place this Summer, nor to effect any thing against *Barcelona*, whilst the Fleet are in these parts of the *Mediterranean*;

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Sabias

It is thought fit to make a disposition of the Troops as followeth.

Forces to remain in Catalonia.

In Barcelona.

Marines <i>Will's</i> , English	1000
<i>Breton's</i> English	500
The City Regiment, his Majesty's	1000
Of <i>Clariano's</i> Horse	150
	<hr/>
	2650

In Girona.

English Fuzilliers	500
<i>Hamilton's</i> English	500
<i>St Amant's</i> Dutch	600
<i>Don Joseph Paguera's</i> , his Majesty's	400
The Deputation, his Majesty's	400
<i>Don Rafael Nebor's</i> Horse, his Majesty's	400
<i>Moraga's</i> , his Majesty's	300
	<hr/>
	3100

In Lerida.

<i>Palms</i> Dutch	700
<i>Sobias's</i> Regiment, Horse	150
	<hr/>

850

In

F

66 *The E. of Peterborow's*

In Tortosa.

Don Antonio Paguera's, his Majesty's 500

Total for the Garrisons of Catalonia.

<i>Infantry</i>	6100
<i>Cavalry</i>	1000
	<hr/>
	7100

*For the Campaign there remains,
Infantry.*

My Lord Peterborow sends by Sea } 1800
to Valencia Englishmen

In the said Kingdom there are in- }
cluding the Regiment of Abu- } 1200
mada.

The Neopolitans of Castillion's Re- } 1000
giment.

Colbatch's Regiment 500

Cavalry.

The Guards of Zinzendorf 500

Morras's Regiment 500

Killegrew's and Cunningham's 1000

Total 6500
3. It

3. It was agreed to take into the Field the following Train, fourteen Field Pieces, four half-Cannon, two Mortars, with Powder, Shot, Bombs, and other Necessaries proportionable; and it being of Consequence to regulate the necessary Baggage, it was left to some Generals to regulate, and concert a Contract, at the most moderate Rate it can be perform'd for. About the 4th Proposition of the Magazines, and Provisions, my Lord *Peterborow* declared he had in the Fleet, Wheat enough for three Months, for twenty Thousand Men, and it was propos'd to make another Contract for Bread and Barley, that should be necessary for the Campaign, always providing Magazines in the most convenient Places. The Operation by Sea and Land, ought to be accomodated to the Motions and Dispositions of the Enemy, endeavouring always to frustrate his Designs, that he may not have any Opportunity of Advantage against us.

4. Where the Residence of his Majesty should be, although he declared his Mind, that he would be at the Head of his Army, it was thought more proper by this Council, that His Maje-

68 *The E. of Peterborow's*

fty would proceed to *Tortosa*, that he may be on the Borders of *Arragon* and *Valencia*, to Animate with his presence, the general Inclinations of his Subjects, in putting them under his Obedience, and to forward the disposition for the Campaign, towards the speedy bringing the Army together, and when so, and fit for Service, that they may be in the Neighbouring Towns, that they may have immediate Notice, and that his Majesty may with more ease issue out those Orders that any Occasion may require.

5. Touching the last Proposal, where the Army ought to join: 'Twas the common Opinion that the most convenient place for the Rendezvous would be nigh *Valencia*, for the ease of sending by Land or Sea with greater Convenience all necessaries for the Camp, and for being the more at hand for the preventing any Attempt of the Enemy.

His Majesty agreed to all the fore-going Discourses and Opinions, and resolved they should be put in Execution with the utmost dilligence, giving my Lord *Peterborow* the care
to

to distribute the Troops, as agreed,
and to send the Horse towards *Valencia*, leaving about four Hundred
Horse for his Majesty's Guard.

By his Majesty's Order

Franc. Adelfo Zinzerling.

per A. Furlly.

The Reader will observe, that in this Council of War there is a disposition of all the Troops we had on this side of *Spain*: a number perhaps that will be surprizing to those, that remember how vigorously and early the Parliament, after the first Siege of *Barcelona*, voted a strong reinforcement to be sent immediately to those parts; and that accordingly the *London Gazette* of *June* 24th 1706 did his Lordship the honour to put him at the head of an Army of 25000. But however his Lordship, contrary to his usual fortune, happen'd to be magnify'd in this particular; all the Forces his Lordship cou'd muster up in *Valencia*, (his Majesty having been pleased to remand, after my Lord was aboard, about 2000 of the 6000 order'd thither) were somewhat
above

above 4000, and wanted of the twenty five thousand little more than the odd twenty.

This Council of War which his Lordship obtain'd, so solemnly agreed upon and a second time confirm'd, shews the Earl of *Peterborough's* earnestness and impatience for the march to *Madrid*. In order to which, the day being settled for the King's leaving *Barcelona*, nay, and the very route of his journey adjusted, his Lordship having sent all the Cavalry before, went on board the Fleet with the Foot, who were in no condition to march for want of baggage-necessaries, and landed at *Valencia* the beginning of *June*. His Lordship thought he cou'd make no better use of his short stay here, than to recruit his shatter'd Cavalry; which he not only did, but mounted a new

Regiment of Dragoons, draughted out of the companies of Foot; there being always in this Country, and especially in our circumstances, which requir'd dispatch, a necessity for a good body of Horse. In which single Regiment I can't but remark what may seem a Paradox to some, that his Lordship sav'd the Queen near 20000 *l.* the Horses, one with another, costing not above 10 *l.* a piece, which if they had been transported from *England* or *Ireland*, wou'd have stood Her Majesty at least in 60 *l.* as we found those actually did which first went upon the descent into *Catalonia*. Indeed it may justly be said of his Lordship, That however liberal he was of his own, no one was ever a more frugal manager of the publick Stock: his Lordship having given several

ral instances in this extraordinary War, that he cou'd sometimes maintain an Army without money, as well as take Towns without men. And this Regiment, to shew his Lordship had no great mind to delay his march into *Castile*, had their route given them, the very same day they were mounted.

And here his Lordship's indefatigable pains, in procuring and purchasing Mules for the baggage of the Army, deserves to be taken notice of: which, though it may at the first view seem a trifle, yet, considering the extream want we were in for them, and our incapacity to take the Field without them, as well as the difficulty and trouble to get them in a Country just exhausted by the Enemy, ought to be look'd upon as no ordinary piece
of

of service; I am sure it was a service that no one there but his Lordship cou'd at that time have done. At least those that saw his Lordship for three weeks together, from morning to night, fatiguing himself in this manner, and submitting to the drudgery of the lowest Officers, did not at all suspect that his Lordship had so little inclination to march, as some have since pretended to discover.

To facilitate our entrance into *Castile*, his Lordship immediately sent Lieutenant General *Wyndham* with a body of 1500 men to besiege *Requena*; a strong and troublesome Garrison, and indeed the only one in the road to *Madrid*, and the first frontier Town of the Enemy: the enterprize succeeded to our wishes, and the way lay open for his Majesty's

jeſty's march. For his Lordſhip prov'd to the King by the conſtant paſſing of Deſerters as well as Expreſſes, that there was nothing now to hinder his Majeſty from reaching *Madrid* with a ſmall party of Horſe only ; and he thought a King needed not much perſuaſion to take poſſeſſion of a Crown, when 'twou'd be rather a journey of Pleaſure, than a March, and this to be eaſily perform'd in a fortnights time.

My Lord having made all the neceſſary preparations for the carrying on the King and the Troops, was ſurpriz'd to find ſuch a delay in the Court: and tho' by frequent Meſſages and Letters he had urg'd the neceſſity of the King's departure from *Barcelona*, his Majeſty did not think fit to ſet out from that place till
near

near a month after the time agreed upon. 'Twas yet a greater surprize to his Lordship, when he had notice that the King, upon his arrival at *Tarragona*, had intirely alter'd all the scheme of his march, and was resolv'd to go round by *Saragosa*. The Earl of *Peterborow* represented, with all the earnestness he cou'd, the danger of the least delay in so critical a Juncture; the hazard as well as the great inconvenience of so tedious a march through so barren and mountainous a Country, and where his Majesty might run the risque of being intercepted and surpriz'd by the Enemy. His Lordship shew'd a more than ordinary Zeal in soliciting this affair: sent Letters every day to dissuade his Majesty from his design'd journey, dispatch'd a Deputation

putation of the *Valencian* Nobility, transmitted the Opinion of Councils of War where the *Spanish* Ministers as well as *English* assisted, unanimously desiring and pressing the King to continue his march the easiest and nearest way by *Valencia*, as was first proposed.

Ex-

78 *The E. of Peterborow's*

*Extracts of Letters from my Lord
Peterborow to the King of
Spain.*

Valencia 5th July, 1706.

C*arthagena* has submitted, and the Garrison consists of 500 Men. *Ra- quena* has Capitulated, the Soldiers Prisoners of War. The Inhabitants without Terms to be disposed of at your Pleasure. Your Majesty will find the Horse and 2000 Foot near *Alarcon*, half way to *Madrid*; the *Spaniards* and *Germans* are on that side.

The way is so free betwixt this and *Madrid*, that the Deserters pass three or four in a Company: Your Majesty may pass to your Capital this way, as in a most profound Peace, and with what Expedition you think fit to make.

I have writ at large to Mr. *Zinzerling*, and have represented to him the pressing Reasons which (in my Opinion) requires your Majesty's presence in your Capital. On this side there are no difficulties, 'tis properly but a Journey of

a few Days; but by *Arragon* it is the Business of six Weeks, or two Months, and all the Affairs of *Europe* in the mean time in suspense; the March also dangerous and uncertain.

Who can offer to your Majesty any Opinion upon the Affairs of *Italy*, and the *Indies*, recommended to Mr. *Stanhope* and my self? All that we can say to your Majesty, is, that the Grand Fleet is not arriv'd, but that your Majesty may in a Fortnights time be at *Madrid*, secure of the *Spanish Monarchy*, ready to give the necessary Orders for the Interest of *Europe*; and that by that time we shall be in a Condition to execute all that your Majesty may think Necessary by Sea and Land.

The Resolution of your Majesty's coming in Person this way is in no wise an Objection to the March of the Troops necessary by the side of *Arragon*. On the contrary when it is known that your Majesty is at *Madrid*, and capable of giving them the proper Assistances; there will be no Difficulties made in that Kingdom. Sir, it is only in your Capital, where the Proper and Necessary Orders can be given.

If

80 *The E. of Peterborow's*

If your Majesty passes directly by *Requena*, without losing one Moment, which seems to me the necessary Resolution, it will be proper for me to stay here to put Matters into such a disposition, as to prevent any delay. If your Majesty does not take this determination, you will be pleased to give me Advice of it, that I may immediately take Post and come to you.

I have borrowed the Money necessary to put your Majesty's Troops in March, and it seems to me there is nothing wanting but your Person at *Madrid*. God Almighty bring your Majesty thither without delay.

Valencia

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Valencia July 6th, 1706.

S I R,

THE City of *Valencia* thought themselves obliged in Duty to let your Majesty know, how extreamly they desired that your Majesty would be pleased to Honour them with your Presence; they have Advertised me that they were sending an Exprefs to *Tortosa*. I have nothing in particular to Communicate to your Majesty, but that they have stopt in the Town of *Campillo*, a Courier sent with Letters from the Marquess *Das Minas* and my Lord *Galloway* to your Majesty; *Don Pedro Moras*, who is March'd that way, shall Chastise those People as they deserve, who have sent those Letters to the Duke of *Anjou* towards *Navarre*. It is said those Generals solicited your Majesty that you would be pleased to pass by *Valencia* towards *Madrid*, that they made offers to your Majesty to send Horse to reinforce ours, if they were wanting, and to inform you that they would not enter *Madrid* without your Majesty, where every thing languish'd for want of your Presence.

G

I

82 *The E. of Peterborow's*

I have received Letters from the Admirals: neither they, Sir, nor I know what to say in this Conjunction. It seems as if every thing were at a stand, till your Majesty gives Life to the whole, by your Presence in the Capital. If I may offer any thing to your Majesty, from the Queen, from the Allies, or from my self, it must be my most earnest Prayers, that your Majesty would not lose one Moment in going to *Madrid*: All suffers by your Absence. I expect your Orders, Sir, that I may go to *Tortosa*, or to prepare every thing for your shortest way by *Requena*, or what else your Majesty thinks necessary. I hope the Count *Savella* is arriv'd near your Person: I refer my self to his Zeal, and to his knowledge of his own Country, assuring your Majesty on my part of a diligence to serve you, and of a most earnest desire to see you the greatest Prince of the Age.

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July 10th.

S I R,

IF it is no more proper to speak to your Majesty upon the Resolutions you have taken, it is now my Duty to do all in my Power to sustain what you have resolved upon, having already complied with my Obligations, in offering to your Majesty (with all possible Submission) my Sentiments, when I thought they might have been of use. In the present Circumstances, I am afraid that the Enemies Cavalry may burn all the Country to the Gates of *Sarragosa*; your Majesty doubtless will have received the Express which came from *Madrid*; he made us highly sensible how much it were to be wished that your Majesty were already there. You will see, Sir, by the Queens Letter, that her Majesty has been pleased to increase my Burden, which was but too weighty before; she has sent me Orders and Instructions, plain and clear upon the present State of Affairs: if I had received them before, I should have represented (if possible) with more force the Necessity of passing

84 *The E. of Peterborow's*

with the utmost Diligence to *Madrid* by the secure way of *Valencia*.

I must Advertise your Majesty in the Name of the Queen, that not only she is making the utmost Efforts for the Interest of your Majesty, in all places where her Troops can Act, but that also the *English* Nation suffers extreamly by the zealous Endeavours for your Service. The *French* have ruin'd some of our Colonies in *America*: *St. Christophers* has suffer'd more than the rest, the Enemy having sent considerable Forces that way, which made them so weak before *Barcelona*. They endeavour'd to secure the possession of *Carthagera*, and the *Havana*. I have the necessary Advices and Instructions upon that great Article, which so nearly concerns your Majesty and all *Europe*: and yet the precious time is lost by a dangerous March out of the way, when your Majesty might Remedy all at *Madrid*.

I obey your Majesty's Orders with relation to the Regiments of *Ahumada* and *Colbatch*: tho' I must take the Liberty to say they are so far advanced in *Castile*, that their March by *Madrid*, would prove the shortest and most practicable way to go to *Saragosa*.

I see by Mr. Zinzerling's Letter, how much your Majesty is in want of Mony. I have some little come from *England*, and will send it immediately to *Saragosa*, after having given the necessary Orders for the March of your Troops according to your Command; esteeming my self most Happy when I can be useful to your Majesty, whose Glory and Establishment I desire above all things.

&c.

Part of a Letter from the King.

My Lord,

I Owe you Answers to Four of yours of the 30th past, of the 1st, and 5th of this Month, which I have receiv'd in different places. You represent to me the Importance of my arriving as soon as possible at *Madrid*, and propose to me the way of *Requena*, as the shortest and securest from Insults. You tell me the Dispositions you have made to accompany my Person, and moreover offer me to come in Person to concert the rest, which might contribute to our good Success; for all which

86 *The E. of Peterborow's*

I am very much oblig'd to you, but being upon the Road to *Arragon*, and engag'd to pursue my March that way, &c.

I consider that the Journey you must make to *Saragosa* to meet me would be too long, and difficult; and since the Fleet is expected each moment, I conceive your Presence very necessary where you are, to direct that important Affair of the Duke of *Savoy*, upon which I have so fully expressed my self in some of my former Letters.

CHARLES.

What

What Opinion his Lordship had of this journey will yet further appear, by a Letter to one of the Ministers in *England*, where his Lordship has set down the natural consequences of so strange a resolution in such a manner, as shews he was no ill Prophet, and could not therefore neglect to prevent (if in his power) mischiefs he so well foresaw. For, how can he be suppos'd to have been so far wanting to his own reputation and interest, as not to have solicited, and pressed for the carrying the King to his Capital; which wou'd have given him the entire glory of finishing the War, and prevented others from any pretence to a share in the honour of placing the King upon his Throne?

88 *The E. of Peterborow's*

*Extract of a Letter writ by the
Earl of Peterborow to a Mini-
ster, from Valencia in July
1706.*

THAT torrent of good Fortune which overcomes all Difficulties, and that infatuation which seems in every place to have seiz'd the Enemy, dissipates those fears I might justly have of Shipwreck in the very Port: But it is a cruel circumstance, that after so many escapes and so many dangers overcome, to see all so injudiciously expos'd by the most unaccountable Resolutions that ever were taken.

You may have receiv'd by *Italy*, before these come to hand, some Letters which I writ in the uncertainty of what the *Portugueses* might do. By all Accounts, the least opposition wou'd have made them turn back: It was hard enough to make them *walk* to *Madrid*, tho' meeting no resistance. And by the Express that pass'd two Days ago by *Valencia* to the King, we are inform'd that the unfortunate Delays to which
his

his Majesty is advis'd in his Journey to *Madrid*, may cause the most fatal changes ; since, if any Foot can join their Horse, which is retir'd from *Madrid* to the number of 6000, I doubt we may see some extraordinary Revolutions.

Judge of my Mortification and Grief, to see so glorious and sure a Game expos'd to what I am going to represent. If I were at the Head of the 6000 *Spanish* Horse, which are very good, I would be accountable with my Life, that instead of the King's coming by *Saragosa* to *Madrid*, when his Majesty was in that Capital, I wou'd burn and destroy all that Country, even to the Walls of that City : That nothing less than the march of the whole *Portugal* Army and the harrasing their Foot, if they cou'd take the Field, shou'd make it possible for the King to get to *Madrid* : That I wou'd at least delay his march till perhaps the *French* Foot and Horse might from *Navar* come into *Aragon* : And then give me leave to say one Battle wou'd decide the Fate of *Spain*.

Not-

Notwithstanding all these advices, remonstrances, and warnings, the King continued firm in his resolution: 'tis needless to shew how fatal a one, since it not only cut us off from all the opportunities of gaining further advantages, but occasion'd some time after the loss of what we had been with so much pains, and I may almost say with so many miracles possess'd of. The King thus persisting in these measures, his Lordship had no other hopes left but that, since he perceiv'd there was a correspondence between his Majesty and the *Portuguese* Army, who were now, as he was told, masters of *Madrid*, those that had the command there wou'd make all the advantages of so happy a conjuncture: and not only secure that Capital till they had safely conducted the King thither, but
take

take care to seize and fortifie the passes in *Navar* ; the only and obvious expedient left, since the King was resolv'd on these new methods , to keep him in the quiet possession of his Kingdom.

I shan't inquire into the motives of his Majesty's Conduct in this particular ; 'tis a matter too nice, and perhaps improper to be examin'd here. But I can't forbear saying it has been with no little astonishment that I have heard my Lord *Peterborow* accus'd, as being the cause of this Journey through *Arragon* : tho' indeed it has been his Fate more than once, to be charg'd even with those miscarriages, which he us'd his utmost endeavours to prevent.

There have been reports spread about, and but too much encourag'd,

92 *The E. of Peterborow's*

rag'd, that the King having demanded Mony for the necessary charges of his journey, my Lord *Peterborow* in a very peremptory manner refus'd to send him any; and that upon this denial, the King was resolv'd to make his progress thro' *Arragon*, where he hop'd a fresh Province, that had lately declar'd for him, wou'd be inclin'd to supply his present necessities.

The story indeed is very plausible: and with this additional report, that his Lordship had received 103000 l. remitted for his Majesty's service, and wou'd give no pay to the King's Troops then in *Valencia*, shews the true spirit of Calumny; which to carry on a malicious design, must not only raise suspicions, but deny facts. For his Lordship was so far from refusing the King upon
this

this account any Mony which he had in his power to give him, that his Lordship not having received any part of the pretended 103000 *l.* was forc'd to order for that purpose a very considerable sum, appropriated to other uses. And 'tis well known to all those that were acquainted with what pass'd in *Spain*, that his Lordship being inform'd of these Calumnies, brought Mr. Mead, the Queen's Paymaster, before the King and Mr. Stanhope, who in regard to these points gave this account to his Majesty; That all his Troops had been paid ten days advance, for which he produc'd their Receipts, That no part of the 103000 *l.* was come to his hands, but that however forty thousand Pound had been advanc'd for his Majesty's service, at the earnest sollicitation of the
Earl

Earl of *Peterborow*, which was design'd and appointed for other services.

Nay, when upon his arrival at *Saragosa*, his Majesty was in want of a Supply, and sent to my Lord *Peterborow* for it, his Lordship immediately dispatch'd all the mony of his own, or what he could get upon Credit, and had his Majesty's thanks return'd in a very obliging Letter. So far was my Lord *Peterborow* from refusing the King mony towards supporting the march that was at first design'd, and so much wish'd for by his Lordship; that he took care his Majesty shou'd not want it even in a journey, which his Lordship cou'd by no means approve of.

It

It is a hard circumstance of my Lord's Fortune, that he must at home be put to prove himself unconcern'd in a matter, which if he had laid any claim to abroad, his pretences wou'd have been utterly deny'd. For a *Spanish* Grandee, a Minister of great Influence at that time, the Conde de *Cisuentes*, took all the merit of this journey to himself; as he profess'd in a Letter he wrote to ingratiate himself and the Court with the People of *Arragon*, to this effect: ' I have
' us'd my utmost endeavours, and
' at last succeeded, in bringing the
' King by the way of *Arragon*:
' which his Majesty comply'd
' with the more easily, being satisfi'd that since the services
' you offer'd were free and voluntary, not like those of the
' *Catalans* and *Valencians*, out of
' any

96 *The E. of Peterborow's*

'any fear or compulsion, you
'had a better Title to his Maje-
'sty's presence among you.

The *Valencians*, who had so distinguish'd themselves in their good services to the King, represented this Letter so far, that they printed it and dispers'd it about the Country: To shew how ill they had been represented to his Majesty, and how all that the Nobility and Gentry of that Kingdom had done and suffer'd for the *Austrian* Cause, was now overlook'd, in compliment to this Noble Counts new favourites and correspondents, the *Peasants of Saragosa**.

*The Letter was directed, A los Labradores de Zaragoza.

By this it appears plainly what a turn the Court then gave to this Expedition. What other motives they might have for it,

to shew his Majesty is

is besides my purpose to inquire; his Lordship having not the least hand in this dark and unfortunate affair. Only it may by the way be remark'd, that his Majesty always gave it as a reason of his going by *Saragosa*, that the Generals of the *Portuguese* Army wou'd move that way, and had promis'd to secure his march to their Camp. And 'tis certain that when Col. *Pepper* was sent by my Lord *Peterborough* from *Valencia* to the King, who was then on his way to *Saragosa*, with the most urgent solicitations to return into the road first propos'd: his Majesty did agree to what my Lord offer'd, and dispatch'd the Coll. back again, with orders to his Lordship accordingly. But a *French* Officer from the *Portuguese* Camp arriving at *Saragosa*,
H the

98 *The E. of Peterborow's*

the King recall'd Col. *Pepper*, and was resolv'd to pursue the route he was in.

But to return to *Valencia*. We have seen the reason of his Lordship's stay here : and sure no one will accuse him for it, as long as he was, tho' very uneasy, in expectation every day of the King's coming, which he was oblig'd to wait for by the fundamental Council of War at *Barcelona* ; or will imagin he ought to have march'd himself, and left his Majesty to have follow'd him alone, thro' a disaffected Country to *Madrid*. His Lordship as soon as he found there was no further hopes of prevailing with the King, or diverting him from his resolutions, immediately order'd all the Forces to advance into *Castile*, except 900 men which were left for the necessary security
of

of the Kingdom of *Valencia*, and in a few days join'd them himself.

And in this he was forc'd to have the Opinion of a Council of War of both *Spaniards* and *English*, to release him from the obligation he lay under of staying for the King: his Lordship having been always so cautious as to act by a Council of War, ever since that (he hopes pardonable) action of taking *Barcelona* without one.

*At a Council of War, held at
the Vice-Roy's Palace in
Valencia, June 26th,
1706.*

P R E S E N T

*His Excellency the Conde of Cardona.
The Conde of Savella.
The Conde of Elda.
His Excellency the Earl of Peterborow.
The Hon^{ble} Brigadier Killegrew.
The Hon^{ble} Brigadier Hamilton.
The Hon^{ble} Collonel Pepper.
The Hon^{ble} Collonel Southwell.
The Hon^{ble} Collonel Allnutt.*

AN Officer arriving Express to *Va-*
lencia from the Earl of Gallway
with Letters for the King, and Prince
Lichtenstein, and none for the Earl of
Peterborow, who never had received from
the Generals of that Army the least ac-
count of their Circumstances, or De-
signs; this Gentleman however giving
informations of great Disorders com-
mitted

mitted by the *Portugueses*, and great Discontents and Uneasiness among the Officers, with Discourses of their Intentions of retiring towards their Frontiers:

Upon due Consideration and Debate of these critical Circumstances, notwithstanding the fundamental Council of War at *Barcelona*, which obliges the Earl of *Peterborow* to attend the Kings Motions, in order to his March to *Madrid*, notwithstanding the Queens Commands to sollicite pressingly the King of *Spains* Consent to embark some Forces for *Italy*; notwithstanding the Invasion threatned from *Murcia*, and *Andalusia* on *Valencia*; yet it is unanimously the Opinion of all present (Subjects of the King of *Spain* and others) that the Earl of *Peterborow* do March all those Forces that are (not near *Altea* ready for embarking but) at *Requena*, and in the Frontiers of *Castile*, either directly for *Madrid*, or to join the *Portugal* Army, as Occurences shall require; and that he send an Officer immediately to the King to renew the desires of all, that his Majesty without loss of time would be graciously pleased to March towards

102 *The E. of Peterborow's*

Madrid by the safe and beaten Road, passing directly by *Tiruel* and the upper way of *Valencia* to *Requena*, where such a Disposition is made of the Forces by the Earl of *Peterborow*, as may secure the Kings Person, his Baggage, and the Troops with him, without any possibility of danger, or requiring any March of the *Portugal* Army further from *Madrid*, which might give some uneasiness or prove of Prejudice to the Service.

per A. Farly.

These

Those who know that two Expresses from the *Portuguese Army* to the King did actually pass thro' *Valencia*, where my Lord *Peterborough* was, may perhaps be startled at the mention made here in this Council of War of the want of *Intelligence* from those parts: but whether it was thro' multiplicity of business, or the difficulty of finding out his Lordship with a body 4000 men, it appears by the following Certificate, that they did not favour his Lordship with the least account of their motions: if that word be not improperly apply'd to their resting 40 days at *Madrid*.

The Copy of a Certificate.

BEing dispatcht from Madrid on the
 29th of June last by the Orders of the
 Marquess Das Minas, and my Lord Gall-
 way, with Letters for his Majesty King
 Charles the 3d: These are to certifie that
 I passed through the City of Valencia this
 Day without having any Letters for the Earl
 of Peterborow, from either of the above
 Gentlemen; and so proceeded on my Journey
 to the King. Valencia 6th July. 1706.

Don Juan de Franques y Luego

per A. Farly.

I have heard it often objected to his Lordship, that he delay'd his march to *Madrid* on purpose, out of an unwillingness to have any dispute about command with my Lord *Galloway*, or to act in concert with the *Portuguese Army*. A Calumny as ridiculous as false, and contrary to the whole tenor of his Lordship's designs and actions. But I reckon it a happiness to his Lordship to be traduc'd not only where there is no colour for it, but where the matter of fact directly contradicts the aspersion.

An immediate march to *Madrid* was what his Lordship wish'd and labour'd for, with all the Zeal and Sollicitations possible, as well knowing there was nothing else wanting to put a finishing stroke to his glorious Successes, and secure the *Spanish*
Mo-

Monarchy to to the House of *Au-*
stria, against any efforts that
 cou'd probably be made by
France. Just before his Lordship
 march'd, he receiv'd Letters from
 the King, informing him that
 now his Majesty was satisfy'd
 every thing was secure in *Spain*, and
 that the *Portuguese* Army wou'd
 be sufficient to protect him from
 any Attempts that the Enemy
 cou'd be lable to make against
 him: and therefore his Majesty
 press'd his Lordship to send the
 Forces under his command to the
 relief of the Duke of *Savoy* pur-
 suant to the Queens instructions,
 or to reduce the Islands in the
Mediterranean.

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The King of Spain's Letter.

My Lord,

BEING assur'd by all hands of the glorious Progress of the Arms of my Allies in *Castile*, and that the City of *Saragosa*, and almost all the Kingdom of *Aragon* have submitted to me; as also having advice that the Army is preparing to approach the Kingdom of *Aragon*, to conduct me from thence to my Capital: I would not lose this Opportunity to assure you a fresh, how desirous I am to see the Duke of *Savoy* assisted with the Fleet, and a Detachment of the Troops: That a Prince may be saved from the last Extremity and Ruin, who with so much Steadiness and Glory sacrifices himself for the Publick, and whose Destruction would be so fatal to the *Common Cause*, and particularly to my Interests in *Italy*.

It is almost apparent in the present Circumstances, that the Troops of the Enemy remaining in *Spain*, are incapable of preventing me the Possession of
my

108 *The E. of Peterborow's*

my Capital, and in Consequence the whole Continent of *Spain*.

Therefore my Lord I am extremely desirous, while you expect the Fleet coming under the Command of Admiral *Shovel* (who perhaps may be actually arriv'd) that you take the necessary Measures upon the arrival of the Fleet to embark all the Troops with the utmost dispatch, which near the Sea side were employ'd in the Expeditions on *Alicant* and *Carthage*, that they may be made use of for the Succours of the Duke of *Savoy*, reserving what Admiral *Shovel* may bring for the Services in *Spain*.

Or in case that the said Succours are not necessary, to make the Attempts upon the Islands of *Majork* and *Minork*: Which Service, after that of *Savoy*, would be most acceptable to me, and most useful to the *Common Cause*, and most advantageous to my particular Affairs; where having left Garrisons necessary for their defence, you might conduct the rest of the Troops to *Barcelona*, &c.

July the 3d,
1706.

CHARLES.

per *A. Furly*.

His Lordship, who perhaps had as good Intelligence as ever any General had in any Country, believ'd his Majesty misinform'd of the true state of affairs; and concluding nothing so necessary in our present circumstances as to prevent, if possible, the return of the *French* into *Spain*, and to secure the Country round *Madrid*, desir'd to be excus'd from complying with his Majesty's directions, and continued on his march thro' *Castile*. So far was his Lordship from shewing any unwillingness to carry his Troops thither, or refusing to advance when he had orders for it, as some wou'd insinuate; That when he did march, 'twas contrary to the King of *Spain's* desires, who urg'd him immediately to pursue the orders he had

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receiv'd from the Queen, and
embarque the Succours for *Italy*.

And indeed his Majesty was
quickly convinc'd, that his Lord-
ship had judg'd right: for in-
stead of being able to go on
triumphantly from *Saragosa* to
Madrid, his Majesty saw a ne-
cessity now of writing pressingly
to my Lord, to come up to him
with all the dispatch imaginable,
to secure his march to the Ar-
my at *Guadalaxara*. This his
Lordship immediately complied
with, join'd his Majesty near
Pastrana; and had at last the ho-
nour of conducting him to the
Confederate Forces: and this
within a fortnight after he had
receiv'd the advices mention'd
above, that his Majesty had no
further occasion for the presence
of him, or his Troops.

By

By this time I doubt not, but the Reader is thoroughly convinced, how false the matter of Fact is in relation to his Lordship's delaying his march: perhaps he may be still better satisfy'd, if, besides this, he finds the reasons alledg'd for that aspersion altogether groundless. His Lordship's Spirit, they say, wou'd not submit to the command of another General, or so much as act in conjunction with him. Some may think it no improper answer to this, if it be reply'd, that my Lord Gallway did actually offer to the Earl of *Peterborow* the command of the *English* Forces, as having had a *Prior* Commission as General to the *West Indies*. However, to prevent any possibility of dispute with either

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either the Lord Gallway or the Portuguese General, his Lordship propos'd how a partition of the Command might be made, so as to satisfie all Parties.

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*A Proposal to the King of
Spain.*

*August the 8th, 1706. in the Camp
at Guadalaxara.*

S I R,

WITH all Submission I take the liberty to represent to your Majesty, the Difficulties which may arise upon the present Circumstances; and I offer all the Expedients possible to serve your Majesty with the Character I hold, without exposing my self perhaps to be found fault with, by the Queen or the *English Nation*.

But, Sir, above all things I am resolved to make no Difficulties, which may any ways bring Prejudice to the Service, or give the least uneasiness to the *Portuguese* or their Generals; and I will take care to propose nothing, that can give them the least Scruple.

The Treaty with the *Portuguese* insers, that the Troops, furnished by the
I Queen

Queen and the States, should be commanded in *Portugal* by a General of the Country. Supposing this in the most favourable Sence, it can extend only to the Troops upon that Establishment; my Troops are independent, and are appointed by Parliament to particular Services, and the Queen has done me the Honour to choose me for her General.

Your Majesty has done me the great Honour to trust me hitherto with the Command of your Troops: though in these Circumstances I will pretend no Command over the *Portuguese* Generals, yet on the other side I can receive no Orders, but from your Majesty. Our English Troops are upon two Establishments, which with the *Portuguese* and *Dutch*, make up our Army. The Partition between the Count *de Noyelles*, and my Lord *Gallway*, and My self, will be equal; the Count *de Noyelles* taking all the *Dutch* Troops into his Care, your Majesty giving me the *Spanish* Regiments, my Lott will be near equal. We shall thus have our particular Charge, and may concur in every thing to your Service. Your
Ma-

Majesty may give the Word to all
Four at once for Forms sake, and af-
terwards to those that are present,
and every thing may be adjusted to
shun any Distinction, &c.

per A. Furly.

I 2 And

And in case this proposal shou'd not be thought proper, his Lordship offer'd, if there was any occasion, to serve as *Voluntier* : and sure a greater instance of resignation cou'd not be expected from one, that then bore the character of General and Admiral, and had credentials for being Embassador. So far was his Lordship from any resentment or emulation in regard to the command of the Forces, or carrying the King himself to *Madrid* ; That provided his Majesty wou'd have gone thither, he would have been content with any other service, or indeed to have been out of all. And tho' the honour of conducting the King to his Capital seem'd a sort of a Right belonging to his Lordship, and which one wou'd think a General wou'd not easily resign, yet
his

his Lordship, long before this, gave a remarkable instance, that he could submit any private ambition to the publick good ; and that he cou'd not only *brook*, but even *contrive*, that another General shou'd enjoy that Glory, which his own labours and services in a manner entitl'd him to. That such a method was propos'd, even before the *French* besieg'd *Barcelona*, and that it was not perhaps ill projected, may be seen by the following Letter.

A Letter of the Earl of Peterborow to the King of Spain from Valencia. March 13. 1706.

I Cannot help offering to your Majesty an advice, which will appear extraordinary. I find many that wou'd propose ways to lose all in our present circumstances, which is to march part of our Troops towards *Catalonia*. I confess, Sir, I wou'd have your Majesty in the present conjuncture take a resolution as extraordinary, as that which brought you before *Barcelona*.

I would not have your Majesty go to *Lisbon*; but embark in some clean Ships I have prepar'd for that purpose, some careen'd at *Argiers* and in other places, and with a fair Wind endeavour to gain the first Land in *Portugal*, putting your self at the head of the 25000 which are in a good condition, on the borders of *Portugal*. The Enemy have but 5000 Men on that side of *Spain* in Arms; affairs well chang'd in our fa-

vour

your, I doubt not but your Majesty wou'd soon arrive at *Madrid*.

Sir, at first this has an extraordinary appearance : but the Voyage from *Denia* to that part of *Portugal*, may be perform'd in a Week without hazard, no Vessels of *France* being upon this Coast. I see nothing so great, so secure for your Majesty. But, Sir, the utmost Secrecy is necessary ; and I wou'd have nobody trusted but the *Portuguese* Embassador, whose Vanity wou'd perhaps be touch'd, to see the finishing Stroke from his own Country. If your Majesty wou'd leave the Prince of *Hesse* Vice-Roy of *Catalonia*, with Orders to follow my Advice in what concerns the War, and the Council of the Count *de Savella*, and some others properly chosen in Business, I wou'd undertake to maintain *Catalonia* and *Valencia*, and perhaps open the way to *Madrid*. This, Sir, perhaps were the finest Stroke in Politicks that any Age has produc'd, and the least expected ; and which might even give the quickest relief to *Catalonia*, which wou'd not be so vigorously attack'd, if your Majesty were in Person elsewhere.

We now find the Earl of *Peterborow* near *Madrid*; and join'd to the *Portuguese* Army, as soon as he cou'd break through the impediments, which obstructed his march, with any pretence or safety: and what cou'd bring him thither but his own inclination and judgment, since he was so well furnish'd with excuses, that would have justify'd his not coming at all? His Lordship expected to have met a flourishing Army, ready to carry the King in triumph to *Madrid*: not questioning but in those 40 days, wherein his Lordship not only made preparations to march into *Castile*, but took *Carthagena*, *Cuenca*, *Alicant*, and *Requena* (places of great strength, and consequence) that the *Portuguese* Generals had with like caution and activity secur'd the Country round *Madrid*.

Madrid. His Lordship being confident, that had he had those opportunities in his hands, he wou'd soon have driven the Duke of *Berwick* beyond the *Ebro*: or at least cou'd never have been so destitute of information, as to have suffer'd an Army of twenty thousand men to come within two hours march of him, without the least intelligence of their approach, or to have given them the opportunity of retaking *Madrid* without a blow.

Yet this was the State in which affairs were, at his Lordship's arrival in the *Portuguese* Camp; and he found the Confederate Army, not prepar'd (as he had hop'd) for a glorious entrance into *Madrid*, but retreating before the Enemy: and every body did that justice to my Lord *Tyravely*, as to own 'twas in a great measure

sure owing to his Conduct, That, upon such a surprize, they were capable of making any retreat.

To recover the disgrace of this almost fatal miscarriage, the general opinion inclin'd to fighting : the Earl of *Peterborow* too well knew the consequences of a lost Battle, and the great advantages that wou'd accrue to the publick by acting *Defensively*, and therefore oppos'd this motion, our circumstances being then the most improper for hazarding the whole of what we had in *Spain*. Yet at the same time his Lordship made an offer to attempt, with 5000 men, the recovery of *Madrid* ; and the methods he design'd to take were allow'd so likely to succeed, that it was approv'd more than once by the King and all the Generals. But *now* consultations were tedious,
and

and executions flow: so that after two or three days debate, the design was laid aside meerly for want of Bread; there being as little preparations made for staying here, as there had been for pursuing the Duke of *Berwick*.

His Lordship, after a few days continuance here, where so little was to be done, resolv'd immediately to put in Execution the Queen's orders, that commanded him to *Italy*. Upon his Lordship's leaving *Guadalaxara*, 'twas reported here in *England*, that he had quitted the Army in discontent and upon his own head, rather designing a Voyage of pleasure to *Italy*, than going thither either upon any business, or by any orders. But so false and frivolous were these imputations, that he had the Queen's positive commands for going; and not only

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only the consent, but even the most pressing sollicitation of the King himself, of his Minsters as well as the Queens, and of all the Generals at *Guadalaxara*. The plainest and best answer to this accusation against his Lordship, may, I think, be taken from the following papers.

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Part of the Instructions to the Earl of Peterborow, and Sir Cloudesly Shovel, dated 4th of May, 1705.

HAVING given You, the Earl of *Peterborow*, a Liberty to serve on board our Fleet, or on Shore, by Virtue of the Commissions and Instructions to you given, as in your Judgment you shall think most convenient for the Publick Service; and considering that, without our special Licence express'd, it might not be proper for you to be absent from either of those Commands, where with you are entrusted; yet for as much as many Occasions may offer, wherein you may be of Service to us in *Negotiations of Importance*, apart from the aforementioned Commands, we think it therefore expedient upon such Occasions, to allow you the Liberty to leave the Fleet under the Command of *Sir Cloudesly Shovel*, and to embark, as Occasion shall require, on some clean Ship for the greater dispatch, towards the more speedy settling and adjusting those Services, to which our Instructions refer.

Part

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*Part of the Instructions to the Earl
of Peterborow dated 3d May,
1705,*

YOU shall upon all Occasions, upon
any Conferences, or Consulta-
tions with any Princes, or States, in
Confederacy with us, with any of their
Ministers or Commanding Officers, en-
deavour to procure in Writing, what
they propose, and require on our part,
what they offer on theirs for carrying
on any designs against the common
Enemies.

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Instructions to the Earl of Peterborough and Sir John Leake, dated June 12th, 1706

WHereas by our Instructions of the 2d of *April*, and the 14th of *May* last, we have directed you to send three or more of our Regiments to the assistance of the Duke of *Savoy*, in Case *Turin* should be besieg'd ; and for putting that Service in Execution, you were instructed to concert with the King of *Spain* ; since which we have receiv'd advices that *Turin* is actually besieg'd. We have thought fit hereby to require you in our Name to press the King of *Spain* to consent to the putting those Instructions forthwith in Execution, and if it be possible to send five of our Regiments to the Duke of *Savoy*, in Case you shall be certainly advised that the Siege of *Turin* is carrying on: The relieving of that Prince being of so great Importance to the King of *Spain* himself, as well as the whole Confederacy, as not to be neglected ; since the Consequence of his being reduced will necessarily be the putting
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ing an end to the War in *Italy*, and leaving the *French* Forces in that Country to be employ'd in *Spain* or elsewhere. And to induce the King of *Spain* the rather to concur in this Service, you are to represent to him that so long as the *French* Troops are employ'd in the Siege of *Turin*, he will have the less Occasion for our Troops in *Spain*, and especially since we have already taken Measures for sending our Forces now in *Portugal* to the King of *Spain's* assistance, in Case the *Portuguese* should, contrary to our expectation, make further Difficulties in Marching forward to *Madrid*. And that in Case they are going on, you are to observe to the King of *Spain* he will then have less reason to detain in *Spain*, the Troops we propose for the Duke of *Savoy's* Assistance. And you are to understand this Instruction, as what we extremely desire to be put in Execution, leaving it to your Care and Prudence to proceed therein so far as is practicable, considering the present posture of the Affairs of us and our Allies in *Spain*: of which you can better judge, being on the place, than 'tis possible for us to direct positively at this distance.

And

And whereas you have an Instruction from our Dearest Consort, the Prince, to make a Detachment of our Fleet, and to repair therewith to *Naples*: In Case it shall be agreed to send assistance to the Duke of *Savoy* upon his being besieged in *Turin*, you are to take such our Troops with you for his Assistance, and land them at *Oneglia* or such other place, as the Duke of *Savoy* and you shall agree upon, and afterwards you are to proceed with our Ships to *Naples*, according to these Instructions. And in Case it shall not be found practicable to comply with both these Services, that is, to assist the Duke of *Savoy*, and to go with a Squadron to *Naples*: It is our Pleasure that you perform the Service for the Duke of *Savoy* preferable to that of going to *Naples*: We being very desirous of taking all occasions of using our utmost Endeavours to support so good an Ally, tho' we are very earnest that both these Services should be comply'd with. And we do not doubt but the King of *Spain* will send such Powers and Directions for the Government of *Naples*, as are requisite in Case of your succeeding there.

*Instructions to the Earl of
Peterborow and Sir John
Leake, dated June 19th,
1706.*

WHereas by our Instructions of the 2d of April, and the 14th of May last, we have directed you to send three or more of our Regiments to the assistance of the Duke of Savoy, in Case *Turin* should be besieg'd, Copies of which Instructions are herewith sent you, and by our further Instructions of the 12th of this Instant *June*, we have order'd three of our Regiments to be sent to the succouring the Duke of Savoy, in Case the Siege of *Turin* is carried on, of which you have herewith also a Copy; since which time we have receiv'd Advices from the Duke of Savoy, and from our Minister residing at his Court that the Siege of *Turin* is pusht on with the utmost Vigour, and that there is an indispensable Necessity to relieve that Prince, if it be possible: We do hereby

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require you, upon the receipt hereof, to send at least three of our Regiments to his Assistance, as far as it may be found practicable. And as we have reason to hope that the King of Spain's Affairs are in so good a Condition, that the sending three Regiments of our Troops can be no Prejudice to him, you are to press him to Consent to so many more, as can conveniently be spared. And as you are hereby directed to send three Regiments at least of our Troops to the Duke of Savoy's Assistance, We do not doubt but you will find the Officers of the States General ready to concur with you, in sending a proportionable number of their own Troops, in Conjunction with the said three or more of our Regiments, pursuant to the Orders they will receive from the States by this Pacquet; and you are to proceed therein as shall be judged most advantageous for the Service by a Council of War, and to Land them at *Oneglia*, or such other place as shall be judged proper, as you are directed to do in our former Instructions.

And though you shall receive intelligence that *Turin* is taken, you are nevertheless to proceed in sending the

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Duke of *Savoy* the said Succours of three or more of our Regiments, with a proportionable number of Troops of the States General, for his Support, in Case he shall be retir'd to *Quieras*, or *Coni*, and shall still stand upon his Defence.

per A. Furly.

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A Letter from Sir Charles Hedges, Secretary of State, to the Earl of Peterborow.

Whitehall, June 19th, 1706.

My Lord,

A Courier being arriv'd from the Duke of Savoy with Letters of the 13th Instant, N. S. giving an account of his being very hard prest in his Capital of Turin, by the French Army under the Duke de la Feuillade, and reduced to the greatest Extremities ; and her Majesty being desirous of doing all in her Power for the support of so good an Allie, and judging it an absolute necessity in order thereunto, that a Reinforcement be immediately sent him, from the Army under your Command : She has thought fit by her Instruction dated this Day to your Excellency and Sir John Lake (which as the most certain conveyance is sent to Sir John Lake) to require you upon the Receipt thereof, to send at least three of Her Regiments to that Dukes assistance, as far as it shall be practicable. The States General are so fully convinced of the Necessity and Importance of this Service, that they have dispatch'd their Orders, which are sent herewith to their General and Ad-

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miral

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miral, and there is no doubt but they will concur with your Excellency, in sending to that Prince, a proportionable number of their own Forces.

There is reason to believe, that even the loss of *Turin* will not induce the Duke of *Savoy* to desert the *Common Cause*, but that he will retire first to *Quieraz*, and afterwards, in Case he shall be pusht, to *Coni*; and there do what he can to keep up the Diversion he has hitherto with so much Constancy and Resolution given to the Enemy: in which Case as your Excellency will see in the Instructions, you are to succour him, provided he be still upon his Defence.

His Royal Highness is so sensible of your Excellencies great Courage and Conduct, and the success that still accompanies your Person, wherever you go, whereby you have more than once restor'd our Affairs, when under Intricate Difficulties, that he has desir'd you might your self bring the Succours to him: to which her Majesty has given her Consent, but leaves it wholly to your Excellency, to go thither or not, as you shall judge it most suitable to her Majesty's Service, and your own Convenience. I am, &c.

C. Hedges

At the first orders of the 12th of *June* from the Queen, to solicit Succours for the Duke of *Savoy*, by their being so entirely approv'd and enforc'd by the King of *Spain*, (as is before observ'd) shew that neither his Lordship's Troops nor Person were thought necessary at *Madrid*: So the orders repeated again and enlarg'd upon the 19th of *June*, and accompany'd with the most earnest recommendations from the *Secretary of State*, were sure sufficient motives for his Lordship's Voyage: a service so much censur'd at home, and so highly valu'd abroad. His Lordship instead of wanting any Apology for these proceedings, has, as the Reader sees, such Authorities for every step he made; that were he now to draw up new Instructions on purpose, and adapt

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them to justifie what he had done, he wou'd not desire them to be in one tittle different from the Instruments just now produc'd. These orders were communicated to the King: and the approbation of all the Generals and Ministers so fully express'd in the *Council of War* here annex'd, give occasion of Astonishment to People abroad, how, or by whom such objections against his Lordship cou'd be rais'd.

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*A Council of War held at
the Palace of Guadalax-
ara the 9th of August,
1706.*

THE Earl of *Peterborow* having communicated to the Council the positive Orders, which he had received from the Queen his Mistress, to attend the Fleet with some Troops to *Italy*; and offering at the same time to contribute, of his part, all that could most conduce to the benefit of the *Common Cause*, and desiring that every body should explain his Opinion in a Case of such Importance, they executed it accordingly, all of them giving the Intimations which they thought most proper: and the Opinions were generally alike the same, in agreeing,

That my Lord should go with the Fleet to *Italy*; procuring that the Admirals should leave a competent number of Ships on the Coast of *Andalusia*, to hinder, by that diversion, the Enemies

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mies Troops, designed for the defence of *Cadiz*, and other Frontier Places, from joynings with the Duke of *Anjou's* Army, to the very great prejudice of the *Common Cause*.

That, my Lord *Peterborow*, having put in Execution the Queens Commands in *Italy*, should without delay, return with the Fleet, and attempt the taking of Port *Mahon*, judging this Conquest of the very highest Importance, in the present posture of Affairs; the Coasts of *Catalonia* and *Valencia* remaining ever expos'd to the Invasion of the Enemy, unless protected by the Neighbourhood of the Fleet. For which end, it is indispensable, that the Fleet be ordered to continue during the Winter in the said Port, and that the necessary Instances be repeated to the Queen of *England*, that She would please to Command, that Her Fleet have such Orders for the ensuing Winter, without which, the conservation of *Catalonia* and *Valencia* must be despaired of.

The Earl of *Peterborow* Charges himself with the Care of sending light Frigats to *Lisbon*, to transport the Money which might have been provided in that Court for the Pay of the Army, as well

well as to bring the Intelligences, that may be Important to the Success of the present Engagements.

P R E S E N T

Marquess das Minas,

Lord Gallway.

Embassador of Portugal.

Count Noyailles.

Her Majesty's Envoy, Mr. Stanhope.

Prince Antonii de Lichtenstein.

per A. Furly.

Besides these Powers to authorize his leaving *Spain*, his Lordship had withal very strong and prevailing reasons from the posture of affairs there. For very miserable was the present condition of our Army, for want of mony; and the prospect still worse, unless effectual means were us'd for a speedy supply. In this necessity the Ministers and Generals earnestly recommended the affair of mony to his Lordship, the Marquess *das Minas* and the *Portuguese* Embassador gave him Bills to transact for them at *Genoa*: and the King, to shew both his want of mony and his confidence in my Lord, gave his Lordship power, rather than he shou'd fail in his Negotiation, to mortgage any part of his Dominions.

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CHARLES, By the Grace of God
King of Spain, &c. Whereas the
Earl of *Peterborow*, General of the
Troops of the most Serene Lady the
Queen of *England* our Sister, and Com-
mander in chief of our Forces, is or-
der'd to go with the Fleet of the Allies
to the Coasts of *Italy*, to advance the
Common Cause, to the great Benefit of
our Subjects and of the Princes of *Eu-
rope*; having by our assiduous applica-
tion and the assistance of our Allies, de-
liver'd our Subjects of the Crown of
Aragon from the *French Yoke*, as ap-
pears by the great and prosperous Suc-
cesses which we have obtain'd in those
parts by the Divine Assistance: Finding
our selves at present at the Head of the
Army in *Castile*, to put an end to our
just Undertakings, and standing in need
of proportionable means for the more
certain accomplishment of that great
Work, which by the late extraordinary
Expences we are at present destitute of:
Having therefore reflected upon the good
Correspondence, which the Republick
of *Genoa* has always held with our Au-
gust House, which leads us to promise
our

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our selves the continuation of the same at so important a Juncture for the quiet and Peace of *Europe*; and the great confidence, which we ought to have in the *known Zeal, Activity, and prov'd Experience* of the Earl of *Peterborow* in our Service: We have resolv'd to give him, besides the Military Powers and Authority, which we have invested him with, Commission, Power and Authority, as we do by these Presents, to Solicite, Treat and Concert in our Royal Name with the said Republick, and its Inhabitants in Common or in Particular, a Loan of 100000 Pistols, or any greater or smaller Sums, at such Interests and upon such Conditions, as shall to the said Earl seem proper; with expresse and ample Power, not only to Sign the Obligations, Writings, and the Necessary Cautions in our Royal Name for the Security of the Sum which shall be lent, but also to grant and give such Assignments as shall seem convenient to the Persons concerned, upon our Royal Rents and Patrimonies of our Kingdoms and Dominions, or of any of them. Wherefore, we grant unto the said Earl of *Peterborow*, the proper Powers and Authority to execute the same, as largely

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largely and amply as above express'd, and as if the said Obligations, Assignments, and other Writs thereunto belonging, were Granted and Signed by us. In Testimony whereof, we order these Presents to be passed with our Royal Firm, and sealed with our Royal Seal.

Given at Guadalaxara, 10 August, 1706.

I the KING.

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Extract out of the Instructions given the Earl of Peterborow by the King of Spain, to be executed in his Voyage to Italy.

Using the Commission and Power, which we have granted unto you by particular Letters Patents, we promise our selves from your *great Conduct*, effectually to obtain the Loan of 100,000 Pistoles from the *Republick of Genoa* and its Inhabitants, using such Measures as you shall think most proper and efficacious to succeed in so important a Business, leaving to your directions, the way and time you shall think most convenient to send us the whole, or part of the said Monies ; being convinced you are sufficiently perswaded how much it imports to the welfare of the Publick, particularly to apply your self for seeking support and remedies to the present urgent Necessities.

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What still further confirm'd his Lordship in this resolution of going to *Italy*, was, that he found at this juncture no occasion for his presence in *Spain*. For the Campaign was now confessedly at an end, and our Generals propos'd nothing else but to go into Quarters in *Castile*, and maintain themselves there, till the Season would give them leave to retake the Field. I must observe here by the by, that his Lordship was mistaken in thinking the Forces wou'd support themselves in *Castile*; but that this was the design concerted, when he left them, appears by the loud remonstrances of all the *Spaniards* against the retreat into *Valencia*: and how much possess'd the King and all his Officers were with this opinion of keeping their ground

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in *Castile*, the Count *Noyailles*
has in the fullest and most sensi-
ble manner explain'd, in a Let-
ter he wrote to my Lord *Peter-*
borow, while they were retreat-
ing.

A Letter of Count Noyailles
to the Earl of Peterbo-
row.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency must excuse me, if you have not heard from me since your departure from *Guadalaxara*. Our Marches, which are remarkable by nothing but the burning of all the Towns, and the Pillage of the Places thro' which we passed, would have given you little satisfaction. With all the Spaniards of my Opinion, I could not prevent our March from *Chincon*, or retard the passage over the *Tage*, in Season so little advanced, and so proper for Action. We were flatter'd, that Winter-Quarters should be established in *Castile*, between the Rivers *Xucar* and *Gabriel*, where we are now Encamped; but it is plainly seen, that we shall March into the Kingdom of *Valencia*, so contrary to the King's Desire. That Precipitate March that we made, much resembling running away, gives our Monarch infinite Chagrine

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and the last Affliction. Our happiness is, our Enemies show so little Vigour, and they seem to content themselves with following us. In my Opinion there is but one resolution to be taken in this conjuncture, to remedy (if possible) measures so inconsistent with the King's Interest, and contrary to his Intentions. What is left us to do, is to possess *Cuenca* with the *Spanish* Troops: perhaps this Resolution of his Majesty will oblige the Generals of the Allies to support it, at least it is undeniable, that this motion of our Troops will manifest to the whole World the Aims and Intentions of this Prince. As I am inform'd, *Cuenca* is a great City, recommended by its situation, the places in this Country having no other Fortification. The taking possession of it was a considerable Service, tho' you were oblig'd to divide the few Troops you had: we are now under the like Necessity to secure it, this Town being one of the best in *Castile*, after *Madrid*. I cannot suppose that the Allies will so far oppose themselves to the King's Desires, and draw upon them the whole *Spanish* Nation, as they would inevitably do, if they should expose their Troops alone

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to secure a Post, so important by all the Rules of War. But it is hard to judge of their Actions, after all we have seen them do this Campaign: We hope, however, the Troops may retire, and have time sufficient for so doing; since the Enemy cannot naturally doubt, but must believe, that we shall sustain this Post with the utmost Vigour, unless they are perfectly informed of our Designs. A little time will clear all our doubts.

The greatest satisfaction that I have, my Lord, is, that we have always had one Opinion: and that we have so perfectly comply'd with what the Queen seem'd so earnestly to desire, in that good Intelligence which was ever between us. I have endeavour'd to keep up the same good Correspondence with the other Generals; for a certain proof of which you know, my Lord, I have made this Campaign, attending the King's Person without Command or Pretension. I think it is hardly possible that Modesty could go a greater length. It is true, those Councils of War, where I have been oblig'd to assist, it was often impossible for me to be of their Opinions, so opposite to mine and those of the

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Spaniards, who should best know their own Country.

Your Fate, my Lord, is more agreeable and happy than mine; you are a Witness in *Italy* of nothing but good Fortune, owing to good Conduct, so much wanting with us. Your presence is wished for here, and unless you bring us *Money*, our affairs are in such an ill Condition, that we must despair of Remedy. Nothing would be more useful to the King, or more agreeable to your Friends, than your coming. Do me the Honour to place me in that Number, and believe me with a perfect Esteem,

My Lord,

Your Excellencies, &c.

Villa Verde, Oct.

23, 1706.

C. NOYAILLES.

His

His Lordship soon after he had left *Guadalaxara*, receiv'd the ill news, that the Enemy, the same night they recovered *Madrid*, had likewise seiz'd all his baggage, which he had left at *Huete*: in which his Lordship lost all his Mules, Horses and Carriages, with all his Equipage prepar'd for his Embassy at *Madrid*, to the value of eight thousand Pounds. The City and the adjoining Villages, which indeed not only might have hinder'd the Souldiers from plundering it, but did actually assist them in it, offer'd publickly to repair his Lordship's loss, by a payment of 10000 Pistoles, or any larger sum that his Lordship wou'd demand. This his Lordship wou'd not accept of; but knowing as well the plenty of Corn there was in this Country, as the ex-

treme want of it in the Confederate Army, chose rather to take this opportunity of supplying the present necessities we were in for Bread ; and oblig'd the Magistrates of that District to lay in such Magazines of Corn, as were sufficient to maintain 20000 men for two months. In so generous a manner did his Lordship provide for an Army, which he had left under the command of another : and sure he won't be thought the worse General for this extraordinary conduct of taking so much care of the publick interest, and so little of his own.

His Lordship upon his arrival at *Alicant*, found peremptory orders from *England* for a Squadron to go to the *West Indies* : so that the designs propos'd for the Fleet upon *Port Mabon*, in the

the Council held at *Guadalaxara*, were intirely prevented. The only thing his Lordship had to do more, before his embarking for *Italy*, was to fortifie and secure the Country and Coast of *Valencia*, against the Insults of the Bishop of *Murcia*: and therefore, though press'd by the King and the Lord *Galway* to send up the Forces there into *Castile*, his Lordship had the unanimous Opinion, not only of all the Gentlemen of the Country, but of a Council of War, that considering the ill circumstances of our affairs in those inland parts, and the necessity of keeping a sure footing towards the Sea, it was of the highest consequence, that the little number we had then in Garrison at *Alicant*, shou'd still
con-

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continue there ; as well for securing the Kingdom of *Valencia* , as preserving the communication with *Castile* : as is more fully express'd in the following Council of War.

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*At a General Council of War,
held at the General's Quar-
ters in Alicant, Sept. 6th,
1706. O. S.*

P R E S E N T

*The Hon^{ble} Brigadier Richard Gorge.
The Hon^{ble} Brigadier Robert Killegrew.
The Hon^{ble} Collonel John Pepper.
The Hon^{ble} Collonel Joseph Stopford.
The Hon^{ble} Collonel Thomas Allnutt.
Lieutenant Collonel Archibald Hamilton.
Lieutenant Collonel George Whitmore.
Lieutenant Collonel William Steward.
Lieutenant Collonel Ellis Cooper.
Lieutenant Collonel Josline Mead.
Major Charles Steward.
Major Salomon Rapine.
Major Thomas Phillips.
Major Theodore Collier.*

UPon several heads proposed to us
by the Earl of *Peterborow*, relat-
ing to the Publick Services on this cri-
tical Occasion: We the Officers com-
posing

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posing this Council of War agree unanimously in the following Opinions:

That, Whereas the King to Sir *John Lake*, and the Earl of *Galloway* to the Earl of *Peterborow*, has signified their Desires, That the Forces employed in the Siege of *Alicant* should forthwith March into *Castile*; We most solemnly declare, That we are sensible the least diminution of the Forces here, would lose immediately all the Country from *Alicant* to *Tortosa*; and not only so, but that the Army and the King's Person would be exposed to the utmost hazard, by the communication being cut off to the Sea, the only hopes of supporting this War, or securing any part of her Majesty's Troops: besides the number here not exceeding nine hundred Foot, is so small, that it would little encrease the force of the Army, but entirely lose all this Kingdom. *Lastly*, It would be the highest Folly to quit the impregnable Castle of *Alicant*, we have taken, and the Troops here are hardly sufficient for the Garrison of that Place.

Upon

Upon what good reasons the opinion of this Council of War was grounded, and how exactly they foresaw what was likely to happen to the Army in *Castile*, appear'd but too visible in less than two months after. And indeed if his Lordship had not by this prudent forecast kept open the communication between the Sea and *Castile*, whither cou'd they themselves, that desir'd these Forces, have made their retreat? or where cou'd their Army have subsisted till the Battle of *Almansa*?

'Twas for the same reasons, that his Lordship resolv'd not to carry any of these Troops with him to *Italy*: and that he thought it more expedient to take the reinforcement design'd for *Savoy*, if he shou'd find that service necessary, out of the Garrisons of *Catalonia*.

But,

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But, his Lordship having been some days at Sea, had the good fortune to meet with the *Mary Galley*, which brought him the welcome news of the great Victory obtain'd at *Turin*: so that now there was no further occasion of carrying any Forces to *Italy*. However, the Negotiations his Lordship was charg'd with for mony, besides the necessity of having his Squadron clean'd there; determin'd his Lordship to pursue his Voyage to *Genoa*. And that none but his Lordship cou'd transact this great affair of the mony, was as evident, as the extremities we lay under for the want of it; and this was not only the sense of all those that assisted in the Councils at *Guadalaxara*, but of all the Offi-

Officers too that his Lordship left behind him in *Valencia*: and the usefulness, or rather necessity of his Lordship's going in Person can't be more forcibly represented, than 'tis in the following Council of War.

The first Brigadier Richard George.
The second Brigadier Robert Killigrew.
The third Col. John Pepper.
The fourth Col. Joseph Stophord.
The fifth Col. Thomas Almon.
The sixth Col. John Hannon.
The seventh Col. William Steward.
The eighth Col. John Cooper.
The ninth Col. John Mead.
The tenth Col. Charles Steward.
The eleventh Col. Solomon Raine.
The twelfth Col. Thomas Phillips.
The thirteenth Col. Theodore Colbert.
The fourteenth Col. John Steward.
The fifteenth Col. John Steward.
The sixteenth Col. John Steward.
The seventeenth Col. John Steward.
The eighteenth Col. John Steward.
The nineteenth Col. John Steward.
The twentieth Col. John Steward.

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*At a general Council of War,
held at the General's Quar-
ters in Alicant, Sept. 6.*

1706. O. S.

P R E S E N T

*The Hon^{ble} Brigadier Richard Gorge.
The Hon^{ble} Brigadier Robert Killigrew.
The Hon^{ble} Coll. John Pepper.
The Hon^{ble} Coll. Joseph Stopford.
The Hon^{ble} Coll. Thomas Allnutt.
Lieutenant Coll. Archibald Hamilton.
Lieutenant Coll. George Whitmore.
Lieutenant Coll. William Steward.
Lieutenant Coll. Ellis Cooper.
Lieutenant Coll. Josline Mead.
Major Charles Steward.
Major Salomon Rapine.
Major Thomas Phillips.
Major Theodore Collier.*

THE Earl of *Peterborow* having
laid before us 'the Commission
from the King of *Spain*, to treat with
the *Genoeses* about Mony, and the Bills
of

of the Marquess *das Minas* for a hundred thousand Pounds to be Negotiated for the use of his Troops, and the present Condition of the Army without a farthing of Mony to pay the Troops: and finding, by the Murther of so many of her Majesty's Officers and Soldiers in *Castile*, the ill effects of the Rapine and Plunder committed by the Army, which cannot be kept in Discipline without Pay, having laid before us likewise, that he has been forced to give the King of *Spain* the Mony destined for the payment of the Forces upon his Establishment, which hitherto having liv'd under the severest Discipline, and with the utmost good Intelligence with the People, we judge it of the highest Consequence that the same Regularity should continue in the Troops, and the same good Correspondence with the People.

For which there being no other Expedient, but Mony, and no Mony to be hoped for but by the Earl of *Peterborow's* endeavouring to obtain it at *Genoa*, and bringing it down in clean Ships from thence upon this Coast, we have been forced to approve the Resolution taken by the said Earl to go in Person, to obviate if possible the fatal Necessity: having

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no Objection, but the hazards, to which we doubt his Lordship exposes himself for the Publick Service.

His Lordship having intimated to us likewise the hopes of a considerable Body of *German Horse*, which may be brought dismounted with their Accoutrements, having already settled something of that kind with the Duke of *Savoy*, which we are sensible would be the highest Service to the King of *Spain* in the present Circumstance; considering also that his Lordship has left the Army upon *positive Orders* from the Queen in relation to *Italy*, the Services being soon to end in these Parts till after the Rains and there being no Troops that can be sent from hence to the Army, or that are of that Consequence as to require the Presence of a General, his Lordship having given to Brigadier *Gorge* all the necessary directions for the Fortifying the Castle of *Alicant*, and providing with Provisions, which when in Condition, we hope may be defended against any Force whatsoever. For these Reasons we agree of the Important Service that the Earl of *Peterborow* may effect by the Voyage to *Italy*: not being competent Judges of the hazards, to which the General may be exposed to by Sea.

By this it appears under what necessities they were in *Valencia*: and that the Army, which was in *Castile*, labour'd under the same difficulties, and was as eager for this supply from *Italy*, may be seen, not only by the Commission and Powers given the Earl of *Peterborow* at his leaving *Guadalaxara*, but by this Letter of Her Majesty's Envoy then with the King of *Spain*, sent to his Lordship, while he was in *Italy*.

Extract of Mr. Stanhope's Letter, dated October 12. 1706.

I Can only tell your Lordship in a few Words, that since you left us, our affairs have gone *de mal en pire*. Our whole Army is quarter'd in the Kingdom of *Valencia*, except a Garrison in *Cuenca*, and another in *Requena*, the only two places we maintain in *Castile*, and for those we are not without apprehensions. Our Horse is ruin'd. Your Lordship knows, how well stock'd with Money you left us, and will consequently judge how impatiently we expect your return.

What

What other Negotiations his Lordship carried on in *Italy*, for I believe he was not idle in the Duke of *Savoy's* Court, is out of my way to relate: but it was some time after discours'd abroad, that a *Defensive War* in Spain, as press'd by the Earl of *Peterborough*, and approv'd by the King of *Spain*, and the Duke of *Savoy*, wou'd have procur'd us the possession of *Toulon*, and consequently a happy end of the War.

To load his Lordship yet further upon this head of going to *Italy*, it was the general clamour here, that his Lordship gave an extravagant interest of 20 per cent. for procuring the mony at *Genoa* (which wou'd have amount- ed to 20000 *l.*) whereas not above one thousand was allow'd by his Lordship above the cur-

rent Exchange: and such a sum obtain'd in such difficult circumstances, in so little time, and at so little loss, perhaps is as extraordinary, as any one of those many Services he did in the *Spanish* War. His Lordship having succeeded beyond expectation, brought the money safe to *Valencia*, where he found all the Confederate Forces under the same pressing wants he left them: and was receiv'd with universal joy, and all imaginable acknowledgments of his good Services.

How serviceable this Voyage was thought of, and how all the views of it were answer'd, can't be more evidently manifested, than by the universal applause of the *Spanish* Nation, and the esteem and respect paid his Lordship by all the Princes abroad: and

and in particular, how sensible his *Catholick* Majesty was of the advantages gain'd by it, appears fully by this Instrument under his own hand.

*An Instrument of the King of
Spain's approving my Lords
conduct with his Opinion in
relation to Naples.*

The King,

ILLustrious Lord, Earl of *Peterborow*,
General of my Troops, considering
that by the Orders you have receiv'd
from the most Serene Queen of *Great
Britain*, my most Dear and much Lov'd
good Sister, you are allow'd (without
any hindrance by the Command by Sea
and Land, which she has put into your
Hands) to pass with some Ships of the
Fleet, which to you shall seem proper,
to the Expeditions most necessary for the
publick Good, which you have lately put
in Execution in your Voyage to *Italy*,
with my *Approbation*, and the *Opinions*
of all the Generals and Ministers, which
were with me in my City of *Guadalaxa-
ra*, at the time of your departure, ob-
taining in that Voyage most *known Ad-
vantages* to my Service, and that confi-
dering that in the present State of Af-
fair

fairs, much greater Benefits may redound to my Crown by the Propositions lately made for your return to *Italy*, having acquainted me with the Designs projected, and settled for the Attempt upon *Naples*, or what may prove Equivalent, not doubting but that your *approved Conduct* in this, and all other the intended Services in those Countries will obtain the Execution of what shall be most proper, and favourable to the publick Interests, and those of my Monarchy, continuing in that *Vigour* which is always found to distinguish your Actions, and which recommends those Measures, which your *Zeal* and *Ability* hath adjusted with the Duke of *Savoy* and Prince *Eugene*, to whom I shall notify by the first Occasion my *entire Satisfaction* in all you have transacted. As likewise to the Queen your Mistress, agreeing in Opinion with the Representations you have made for your speedy return to *Italy*, that your *Personal Assistance* may give warmth and procure favourable Events, to the important Affairs depending in those parts, considering it highly necessary that you should be near the Duke of *Savoy* at this Conjunction, and believing you will receive from her

British

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British Majesty Orders that may conduce to the accomplishment of those propitious Events, which I promise my self from your Voyage, and *known diligence*; for the Interest of my Cause and the publick Good; trusting that your Zeal and Love for my Service will engage you with that Sincerity, which you have ever practis'd to procure the most effectual Endeavours, for the Execution of the Designs in Hand. And if leaving them accomplisht, or in a prospect of Success, you think fit to return to these Kingdoms, you shall find in my Royal Presence all the demonstrations of Satisfaction, you have reason to expect.

At Valencia the
4th of February,
1706, 7.

I the KING.

By Order of the King our Lord,

Don Enrique de Gunter.

This

This Royal Testimony, I think, not only shews his Majesty's entire Approbation of this Voyage, but sufficiently confutes those malicious Insinuations, that have been made of the King's displeasure to the Earl of *Peterborough*. I have often heard my Lord say, That he never once met with the least difficulty from the King, when he himself was present with his Majesty; but that all measures were agreed upon, all Councils of War and Resolutions drawn up perfectly to his satisfaction. In his absence indeed false suggestions, and the contrivances and cabals of others have too often prevail'd: and during the correspondence with the *Portugal* Army, not only unfortunate methods took place, but as his Lordship found at his return from *Italy*,
the

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the King had, by some Artifices, been wrought upon to signifie to the Court of *England*, some kind of dissatisfaction with his Lordship's Conduct. But that Prince has been since pleas'd fully to justify to the World the proceedings of his Lordship; and how sensible his Majesty was of his Lordship's affection, how well satisfy'd with his services from time to time, I can't better express than in his Majesty's own Words.

Let-

*Letters of the King of Spain to the
Earl of Peterborow.*

My dear Lord,

AS I have often in so many occasions experimented your great Zeal and Affection for my Interest, and Person, so in the fatal conjuncture I now find my self, I place my greatest Confidence in you; hoping that with the utmost resolution and diligence you will endeavour to succour a Prince, and without loss of Time, who (as the present hazards I am expos'd to demonstrate) Sacrifices himself for the Publick Interest, rather than abandon his Faithful Subjects, and what you have so Gloriously contributed to Conquer.

I am in hopes, That as you have with so much Reputation possesst *Catalonia*, so I shall likewise owe you the obligation of my Deliverance from the present Exigencies. The Enemy is within two Leagues. My Subjects are in a disposition to shed the last drop of their Blood for me, but wanting Powder and Provisions for a long Defence: It belongs

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longs to you, my Lord, (by so glorious an attempt) to relieve a King in such Necessity.

You may represent the condition of my affairs to my Faithful Subjects, animating them, as well *Catalans* as *Valencians*, to shew at this time their true Love and Zeal. Endeavour, my dear Lord, as soon as possible to advise Admiral *Lake* and *Wassanaer*, that they may contribute of their part to my relief, that out of this present danger I may continue to expose my self for the *Common Cause*. I could be content to lay down my Life in this place, if my preservation were not of greater use to the General Concern.

My hopes then are all in you: and you may concert in every thing as far as possible with the Count *de Cifuentes*, Prince *Henry*, and my self, and with my Lord *Donnegall*, who is advancing of his side, as well as the Country People of these parts. Lose no time, my Lord, to come to my assistance, least it prove too late. We want every thing here, to resist and defend ourselves for any Time. Adieu, my Lord, I hope to embrace you in few Days,

as

**as glorious as possible: Lose no Time.
I shall ever remain with the same af-
fectionate Inclination.**

**Barcelona the
30th of March,
at Night, 1706.**

CHARLES.

My

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My Lord,

I Hope this will find you happily arrived in the place you designed for going from hence, and that you will find there no difficulties in the execution of your *glorious Designs*. At my arrival in this place, your *Presence* had been very agreeable to me, to have conferr'd with you upon the state of my affairs, and several other things not to be neglected in the present conjuncture.

As the Emperor, my Brother, gives me to understand in the last Letters I have receiv'd, his Resolutions of sending the Duke of *Moles* as his Embassador ; I suppose the said Duke is actually now at *Genoa*, or will come thither in few Days: Therefore you will very much oblige me, in a service so necessary to the Publick, by taking the proper measures for his secure passage upon his arrival at *Genoa*, in case he have not the good fortune to come in your Company. I hope God Almighty will take you, my dear Lord, into his Holy Protection, assuring you of my *Constant, Perfect Esteem, and Acknowledgments*.

Valen. 11. Octob. 1706.

CHARLES

His Lordship, after his return to Spain, acted in no publick Post; yet, upon all occasions, shew'd the same concern and zeal for the publick good, and the prosperity of her Majesty's Arms. And tho' he was dismiss'd from the command of the Army, yet he did not think himself exempt from using his utmost endeavours to promote the Interest of the *Common Cause*: and took the liberty to offer his advice in such affairs, as he thought his experience and knowledge of the Country enabled him to judge of. Therefore, in Council of War held at *Valencia*, Febr. 4. 1706. he gave in writing his opinion, concerning the management and conduct of the ensuing Campaign.

*The Earl of Peterborow's
Opinion declared in a Council of War held at Valencia, Feb. 4th, 1706.*

AN *Offensive War* is of *Eclat* and Reputation to the Generals and the Troops; but the *Defensive* is often of most Utility to the Publick.

Our Circumstances require vigorous Efforts in *Italy* or *Spain*. In the last, the *Defensive* secures us the Crown of *Arragon*; but the Troops in *Italy* can only give the Mortal Blow; that is, enter *France*. Neither can it be doubted, if the *French* desist from their Hopes in *Italy*, but that the great Force in that Country will be usefully employ'd by the Duke of *Savoy* and Prince *Eugene*.

No positive Opinions can be given without knowing the Condition of the Fleet; without the Assistance of the Sea, the best dispositions in *Italy* are useless. If that were wanting, all must be hazarded in *Spain*; the War there being of an inconceivable Expence to the

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the Allies. But the difficulties of subsisting Armies in *Castile* are sufficiently apparent by the last Campaign; and the Dangers are evident of putting the whole upon the risque of passing to *Madrid*, before an Army so superior in Cavalry.

The *Tage* must likewise be passed before the Enemy (if Marching by *Murcia*) without *Pontoons*, or the necessary Preparations for such an Attempt. The Precipices of that River are natural Fortifications: If there are Plains near *Aranjuez*, it is almost equally impossible to pass them before an Army in *Batalia*, without a great Superiority in Artillery. And nothing is more easie to a Body of Horse so numerous, than to cut off the necessary Provisions in a Country, where they are so scarce.

If the Troops advance into *Castile* towards *Madrid*, without taking the necessary Precautions for the Defence of *Catalonia*, either *Madrid* must fall into our Power, or all is lost. It is to be doubted, whether the possession of *Madrid* (without the Defeat of the Enemies Army) be decisive; but the loss of *Catalonia* is certain, if the Places there are not better Fortified, and Provided:

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And if Forces are not sent into that Province, or those parts of *Arragon* near that Frontier, which may serve at the same time for the Defence of the Fortify'd places of *Catalonia*, and towards preventing the Succours from the side of *Navarre*.

If we hope for a Maritime Force betimes in these Seas, which may be superior to the Enemy, there does not appear the least Necessity for rash Measures: And the least Disgrace, or great Fatigues alone may give our Troops that Inclination to desert, which the Enemy will not fail to improve, when in a proper Situation.

Above all things the Defence of *Catalonia*, and what we have, is Necessary. Our Intelligences assure us, that great numbers of Troops assemble in *Roussillon*, and that great Magazines are forming there for Foot and Horse, and all Warlike Necessaries. But to conclude, what better Opinions can be offer'd than those of the Duke of *Savoy* and Prince *Eugene*? Who have doubtless communicated them to the Emperor, the Queen, and his Catholick Majesty, where that Duke has Ministers.

Soon

Soon after this his Lordship left *Spain* : but carried with him the same concern for the good success of Affairs there, and writ a Letter from *Italy*, pressing more earnestly, and explaining more at large the same advice, he had given in the Council of War.

A Letter writ to the Portugal Ambassador from Italy.

Turin April 21st, 1707.

My Lord,

I Assure you, I am with a particular Inclination your Servant. I look upon you as my Friend, and Companion in all the Miseries, and Mortifications of the *Spanish War*; in all places I shall be a Witness of your Conduct and Prudence, and of the Steadiness you have shewn upon so many extraordinary Occasions.

Would to God you were free from uneasiness, when I hope to be in quiet! it seems to me as if Storms were threatening *Spain*, and I am the more concerned, because of the probability of your Generals continuing in a disposition to rash Measures. It is certain, they are only in a Condition for a *Defensive*; and that suffices for the Publick, since the

preparatives against *France* are so terrible in *Italy*, and in *Flanders*. You know my Opinion in the Councils of War held at *Valencia*: But the Succours which are coming, and the Person of the Duke of *Orleans*, are certain proofs of the great Efforts the Enemy will make in the beginnings of the next Campaign. If we prevent their first Impetuosity, whilst *Naples*, *Sicily* and *Sardinia* may be secured, Peace will give us all we can desire. I am obliged to give you notice, that no Endeavours can prevent the Imperialists from Marching towards *Naples*; if it is impossible to hinder that Diversion of their Troops, it is our Interest to give the necessary help towards bringing that affair to a speedy Conclusion. And methinks, one might hope upon the Success of that Enterprize, that those Troops might be solicited and obtain'd for the Succour of *Spain*.

But, my Lord, pray consider the Consequences of a *lost Battle* in the Spring; perhaps a Disgrace were less fatal in *Flanders*. By a superiority of *Horse*, such a Misfortune may happen to the *best Foot* in the World, which will be cut off entirely in case of a *Defeat*, and all *Spain*

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at the same time lost, for want of Garrisons in the strong Places we possess. If we defend well what we have, their great Number of Horse will consume it self for want of Forrage, or destroy that part of the Country which is ill affected; and be called for by their pressing Necessities elsewhere, since we have in this Country near 70000 effective Men, for the vigorous Measures that are concerted.

I know, my Reasons, though good, will have little force with the Generals; they have the last Campaign in their Thoughts, and have not perhaps the same tranquility of Mind, and quiet, which I thank God I enjoy. Being well content with the beginnings I have made, only wishing a happy conclusion to this great Affair: assuring your Excellency that nothing Private shall ever mix with my Thoughts for the Publick. But I justly lay a stress on the great Credit you have with every Body, and am well assur'd, that the Interest of your Country requires Measures of the utmost Precaution; since your best Troops are in *Spain*, and that a *Defeat* would expose *Portugal* before Succours can arrive; since *England* has left her self almost unprovid-

vided with Troops, and that the Forces in *Italy* being design'd for other Services, it will be difficult to obtain any of them, tho' the Circumstances pressingly require it. I therefore entreat your Excellency to think again of the Consequence of a *lost Battle*. God be praised we are not in a Necessity of a Victory: That is the Circumstance of *France*.

I told you when I went away, that I would send you the Measures I had propos'd to the King, which to me seem'd certain of Success; but any division of the Troops would never be listen'd to, which however was the only way possible to secure *Madrid*. Quick Motions were requisite before the Succours could arrive from *France*, and those are never taken with great Bodies. My thoughts were to defend the Entrance into *Valencia* with 2000 Horse and 8000 Foot, which were easie with less Force; and with 11000 Foot and 5000 Horse to have gain'd the Head of the *Tage*, by a stolen March. We might have had as many *Arragonefe*, as we could desire; who for the Mountains, and defending the passage over that River would have equal'd our best Troops, and have been
bet-

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been better for long and speedy Marches. Thus we might have put the *Tage* betwixt us and the Enemy; *Madrid* had been found without Defence, and the Duke of *Anjou* oblig'd to a second Journey towards *Burgos*. This particularly would have hinder'd the junction of any Succours from *France*: The Troops left in *Valencia* would have followed the Enemy at a proportionable Distance, when they march towards the *Tage*; and I assure you such Resolutions well pursued would sufficiently have perplexed the Enemy. Another time I will explain more distinctly this Project to you, in giving you Answers to all the Objections might be made.

At present I have nothing to propose to your Excellency, nor to wish, but that the Troops might not be fatigu'd in the impossible Views of gaining *Madrid*, half the Army being expos'd to Destruction, by Diseases, and Famine, or in the whole in a very improper time by an *unequal Battle*. I will neglect nothing in my Power to obtain, in a favourable Opportunity, a Succour of Troops for *Spain*; that in the after Season we may push our Affairs.

Conduct in Spain. 187

Affairs. I desire you to assure the King of my inviolable *Attach* to his Interest, which nothing can diminish. Present my Service, &c.

PETERBOROW.

This

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This Letter shews how well my Lord judg'd of the posture of affairs; and how reasonable it was to think of nothing else, but a *defensive War* in the present juncture. My Lord, I dare say, heartily wishes he had been mistaken in his judgment; but in a few days after the writing of this Letter, those who had no regard to what he foretold, took care most punctually to fulfil it.

And now, that I have shewn how early (before the *French* besieg'd *Barcelona*) my Lord *Peterborow* was solliciting and contriving for the Earl of *Galloway*, the opportunity and honour of carrying the King to *Madrid*: how generously he refus'd 10000 *l.* from the *Castilians*, and oblig'd 'em in lieu of that to furnish the whole Confederate Army with
Pro-

Provisions for two months: how willingly he run all hazards, and incurr'd the censures and reproaches of some that should have thank'd him, to procure mony, and support a starving Army now under the command of other Generals: how well he forecast, and how earnestly he propos'd the proper measures for future success, when he was out of service himself: Let the World judge whether the Earl of *Peterborow* acted by a Spirit of resentment, emulation or envy; or whether there are not clear and undeniable proofs of his Lordship's unweary'd Zeal and Labours for the prosperity of her Majesty's Army under the command of the Earl of *Galloway*.

After this last effort for the publick service, his Lordship
went

went again to *Turin*, where he was received as before, very kindly and honourably. And I never heard my Lord regret any disappointment, but this only, that he was not permitted to stay a *Voluntier* with the Duke of *Savoy*, or his Friend Sir *Cloudestly Shovel*: but was recall'd home with great importunity, tho' in no good condition for travelling, and oblig'd to leave a very *Worthy Son* in ill circumstances under his Wounds; the second that has been crippled, and in a manner sacrific'd to the publick in this War.

The

THE account I have here given, has been only a bare Narrative of some part of the Earl of *Peterborow's* Conduct in *Spain*, founded upon matter of Fact, and I think clearly made out from *original papers*. I don't doubt but the Reader, who has observ'd the caution and regularity of his Lordship's management, has been beforehand with me in doing Justice to his Character: and must needs be satisfy'd, that as his Lordship had in all his actions the honour of Her Majesty and the interest of his Country at heart, so neither was he without all thoughts of providing for his own proper defence, tho'd these actions, through envy or ignorance, be mis-represented at home. For whatever clamours have been
rais'd

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rais'd against his Lordship, he is so well furnish'd with materials to justify what he has done, that shou'd he ever be put upon a necessity of producing them, the World will be perhaps as much surpriz'd to see how little his Accusers have to say against him, as He was that he cou'd be accus'd.

I never yet met with any so hardy, as to reflect upon his Lordship's courage and bravery; tho' this quality, so eminent in his Lordship, might with as good reason be call'd in question, as his Judgment and Conduct: since in the whole series of his successful undertakings, his circumstances oblig'd him to make more use of thought and contrivance, than of force or valour. Most people, I believe, are apt to judge of men's Conduct by the
course

course of their Actions: when they see designs laid with prudence, carry'd on with industry, and executed with vigour; when they see men always upon the watch to lay hold of and improve opportunities, taking all the measures to know the true strength of an Enemy, and to make their own appear to advantage; when they see them choose the proper times of using all Offensive and Defensive Stratagems, and so manage a small force, as, even without fighting, to defeat all the Efforts of a numerous Army; they cannot but think these no ill proofs of a cool understanding, and a wise management: and I must own my self to be so far of the opinion of the Vulgar, as not to like such men the worse for success. So that were I of Council to his Lord-

O

ships

ship's Enemies, I would advise them to deny every thing that has been done in *Spain*: since unless they will allow of Miracles in this *Catholick* Country, I know nothing that can account for such important and continued successes, but his Lordship's Sagacity and Conduct. And, I believe, 'twill readily be own'd by all impartial men, that such a *Collection of Papers* as his Lordship has, (a few of which only I have here produc'd) wou'd hardly have been preserv'd by a Man, that acted at Random, and without much thought, or precaution. And his Lordship desires no farther favour, than that the World would judge of his proceedings as the Evidences of them shall appear, whenever or wherever they shall be brought to an Examination.

After

After I had finish'd the foregoing relation of the Earl of Peterborow's Actions, which had been most mis-represented, and from whence all the objections against his Lordship's Conduct have risen: having materials ready at hand, I was tempted to give an account of some Actions of his Lordship's, which have met with a different, but not much better Fate; and have been so intirely conceal'd, as scarce ever to have been discours'd of in England. The Campagne of Valencia is a subject so new, and so little known, that, I hope, upon that account at least it may give some entertainment to the Reader. The reduction of that Kingdom was so remarkable, and the methods by which it was carried on so extraordinary, that, notwithstanding all the care I shall take to relate what

which it was carried on so extraordinary, that, notwithstanding all the care I shall take to relate what pass'd with the utmost veracity and exactness, an account of them will still have more the air of Romance than History. A course of such happy Temerities (I make use of this term, since 'tis the fashionable word to express the Actions of his Lordship) will appear the effect of more Thought and Application, than the hurry of War seems to allow of: and a brief relation of them will set the judicious Conduct his Lordship us'd in a true light, notwithstanding so much affected silence, and such industrious malice.

CAMPAGNE

O F

VALENCIA.

After the taking of *Barcelo-*
na, in the first consulta-
 tion about the War, the Earl of
Peterborow was of opinion, That
 the Forces shou'd be divided, and
 the better half march immedi-
 ately into *Valencia*, the rest into
Arragon. The *Dutch* and *English*
 Major Generals, *Comyng ham* and

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Schrat-

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Schratenbach, were against fatiguing and diminishing the Troops, which they thought must be preserv'd with the utmost caution, since they were hardly sufficient to defend the places we already possess'd in *Catalonia*. The latter opinion had its weight, and prevail'd: and rest cou'd hardly be refus'd to Troops, that had undergone such hardships at Sea, and the fatigues of such a Siege. However, my Lord so far prevail'd, as to obtain universal consent to send a good body to *Lerida*, and about a 1000 Foot and 200 Horse to *Tortosa*, the bordering City on the Kingdom of *Valencia*.

Some time must be allow'd to recruit and repair thatter'd Regiments: but a few days rest, good Diet, and Encouragement, soon recover the Souldier of any fatigue,

fatigue, and make him fit and willing for service. It is plain by what follow'd, that an immediate march, and a sufficient sum of money for the procuring a body of Horse, had enabled us at that very juncture to over-run Spain, before the Enemy cou'd have had time to oppose so vigorous and unexpected an attempt: And that the ill Quarters at *Barcelona* destroy'd more men, than wou'd have been lost in Action, and moderate Marches, tho' in Winter-time.

My Lord most impatiently press'd for leave from the Court to march into *Valencia*, tho' attended with so small a force: but there were some there, who were better pleas'd, that the reduction of that Kingdom shou'd seem to be procur'd by their correspondence and management,

than that it shou'd be owing to her Majesty's Arms. These artifices wrought such delays, as had like to have prov'd fatal. 'Tis true indeed, that in the mean time a revolt had been brought about in the City of *Valencia*, and a Vice-roy nam'd (the Count *Cisuentes*, a Person unacceptable enough in that place) before any particulars of the manner of it were known. But the rejoycings upon this occasion were of short continuance; and these slow proceedings of the Ministry gave the Enemy time, to bring a considerable body of disciplin'd Troops before *St. Mattheo*, under the command of the *Comde de las Torres*, who had serv'd in the War of *Italy*, a General of known Courage, and of long Service.

This

This news gave great alarms to the Court at *Barcelona*, and occasion'd the report that all the *Militia of Catalonia, Valencia*, and some adjoining places in *Arragon* had taken up Arms, to the number of 16000 men; that they had secur'd such places and passes, as wou'd make the subsistence of those Troops before *St. Mattheo* difficult, and their retreat from it impossible: and that there was nothing wanting to their utter destruction, but a few Officers and some of the disciplin'd Troops to encourage and direct this multitude, so conveniently posted.

St. Mattheo was a place of great importance by its situation, in regard that all communication between *Catalonia* and *Valencia* must have been interrupted, had it fallen into the Enemies hands; and all our hopes and expectations

tions in that Kingdom must have
vanish'd with the loss of this
Town. In these circumstances
the Earl of *Peterborough* receiv'd
the following Orders from the
King of *Spain*.

had taken up Arms; that they had
bet of 1000 men; that they had
second such place and passed
would make the substance of
those Troops before St. Michael's
difficult, and then retreat from it
impossible; and that there was
nothing wanting as their water
supply was cut off by the French
and some of the English Troops
to encourage and direct this
kind, to conveniently posted
St. Michael's was a place of great
importance by its situation, in
regard that all communication be-
tween Catalonia and Valencia must
have been interrupted; and it
fallen into the Enemies hands;
and all our hopes and expecta-
tions

The

The KING.

Illustrious Earl of *Peterborow*, General and Commander of my Troops, Having this Moment receiv'd Advice, that in the Wood of *Vallvana*, between *Morella* and *St. Matheo* in the Kingdom of *Valencia*, *Tilly* who has with him a 1000 Horse, and a 1000 Foot, is surrounded by the Country People, who have possess themselves of all the Passes; and having demanded from the Officer, who is at *Tortosa*, some regular Men to animate those of the Country, and being answered that he had no Orders, without which he could give no Men; I have resolved, considering the great Advantage it will be to my Royal Service, if such a happy Operation could be successfully executed, to write and participate to you this Opportunity, that you may give speedy direction in it, and send the convenient Orders to the abovesaid Officer, that he may give immediately the Men you shall think sufficient to execute it with Success, which I expect from your great Zeal, Conduct and Prudent Dis-

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Disposition : For according to the Situation, in which they assume the Enemy is, *it is impossible that any can escape*, if the Troops of the Queen which are at Hand in the said Town of *Tortosa* assist in time, to animate the Country People, which are got together to that end.

*Given in Barcelona the 31st of
December, 1705.*

The

The Earl of *Peterborough* regretted the lost time too much, to lose one moment more : and instead of sending to a Subaltern the Orders requir'd, he immediately took post ; and tho' *St. Matteo* was above 30 leagues from *Barcelona*, in about eight days time from his departure, he found ways to raise that siege. And indeed the methods taken in effecting it were as much out of the common road, as the resolution to attempt it.

My Lord never rested night or day, till he came to *Tortosa* ; but had sent a Courier before with Orders for Brigadier *Killigrew* to march, so that the Troops had pass'd the *Ebro*, before he arriv'd. As soon as his Lordship came thither, he summon'd the Governour, the Magistrates and Officers, and to
his

his great astonishment, was inform'd, that the Enemy was three times stronger than was represented; and the report of the Countries being up in Arms was so intirely false, that not one of those sixteen thousand, who were order'd to let *his* Body escape, was in being. The truth of the matter was, that the Enemy was before St. *Mathea* with between 2000 and 3000 Horse, and about 4000 Foot; and the Earl of *Peterborow* had nothing to depend upon, but 1000 Foot, and 200 Dragoons. It is not hard to guess, what the general opinion was in these circumstances; neither did the Earl of *Peterborow* endeavour to persuade the Officers, that it was reasonable to approach such numbers with so inconsiderable a force: his Lordship only made them sensible, that unless he could raise
that

that Siege, our affairs were desperate, and therefore capable only of desperate Remedies. Upon which he desir'd his Officers to be content, to let him try his Fortune, whether he could not by diligence and surprize effect that, which by downright force was utterly impracticable. The confidence, that these Gentlemen had in my Lords care and intelligence, made them on all occasions approve of or acquiesce at least in his Designs, whatever Difficulties might seem to lie in the way.

It is certain the *Conde de las Torres* had not the least notice of the approach of any Enemy, till those employ'd by the Earl of *Peterborow* gave him the account; which was in such a manner contriv'd by his Lordship, and perform'd by his Spies, that it obtain'd the desired effect. And it must
be

be confess'd to his Lordship's great honour, that to such extraordinary Thoughts, and such diligent Executions, were owing all our successes in *Spain*.

My Lord never made use of any *Spaniards*, without getting the whole Family in his possession, to be answerable for those he employ'd: and as the People of that Country have very good natural parts, and will run any hazards for money, it was hard for the General of the other side to avoid being impos'd upon, without renouncing all intelligence, and giving credit to nothing, though never so probable.

By marches in the mountains, by dividing his troops, and by the help of obscurity, his Lordship brought all his men to meet in one night, at a place call'd

call'd *Traguera*, within six miles of the Enemies Camp : and there having got them within the Walls, by his diligence and care he prevented any Person from going out of Town to give the Enemy intelligence. He begun his march before day, and having with a small Party view'd the Woods and the Hills, he plac'd a few Dragoons and *Miquelets* so conveniently, that they cou'd not be seen but by those they had already pass'd by, which his Lordship took care to secure : so that all the soldiers were brought to their respective Posts to appear at an hour prefix'd, soon after his Lordship's Spies had made the intended impressions in the Enemies Army. What this stratagem was, and what influence it was design'd

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to have upon the Enemy, will be best conceiv'd from this Letter his Lordship wrote to Coll. Jones, who was then Governour of St. Mattheo.

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To Collonel Jones.

YOU will hardly believe your self, what this Letter informs you of, if it comes safe to you; and tho' I have taken the best Precautions, it will do little Prejudice, if it falls into the Enemies Hands: Since they shall See and Feel the Troops, as soon almost as they can receive Intelligence, shou'd it be betray'd to them. The end for which I venture it to you is, that you may prepare to open the furthest Gate towards *Valencia*, and have your thousand Miquelets ready who will have the Employment they love, and are fit for, the following and pillaging a flying Enemy. The Country is as one can wish for their intire Destruction. Be sure, upon the first appearance of our Troops, and the first discharge of our Artillery, you answer with an *English* Halloo: And take to the Mountains on the right with all your Men. It is no Matter what becomes of the Town; leave it to your Mistresses. The *Conde de las Torres* must take the Plains; the Hills on the left being almost

P 2

most impassable, and secur'd by five or or six thousand of the Country People. But what will most Gall him, the old Regiment of *Nebot*, which revolted to us near *Valencia*, is likewise among them.

I was eight Days ago my self in *Barcelona*, and I believe the *Conde de las Torres* must have so good Intelligence from thence, that he can't be Ignorant of it. What belongs to my own Troops and my own Resolutions I can easily keep from him, tho' nothing else. You know the Force I have, and the Multitudes that are gathering from all parts against us; so that I am forc'd to put the whole upon this Action: Which must be decisive, to give any hopes to our desperate Game. By nine or ten, with in an Hour after you can receive this assure your self you will discover us on the tops of the Hills, not two Cannon Shot from their Camp.

The Advantages of the Sea are inconceivable, and have contributed to bring about what you could never expect to see, a force almost equal to the Enemy in number; and you know less would do our Business. Besides never Men were so transported, to be brought with such Secrecy so near an Enemy. I have

near

Campagne of Valencia. 213

near six thousand Men lock'd up this Night, within the Walls of *Traguera*. I do not expect you should believe it, till you see them.

You know we had a thousand Foot and two hundred Dragoons in *Tortosa*: *Will's* and a thousand Foot, *English* and *Dutch*, came down the *Ebro* in Boats; and I embark'd a thousand Foot more at *Tarragona*, which I landed at *Vinaros*; and the Artillery from thence I brought in Country Carts. It was easie to assemble the Horse: *Zinzendorf* and *Moras* are as good as our own, and with our *English* Dragoons make in all near two thousand. But the whole depends upon leaving them no retreat without interruption.

Dear *Jones*, prove a true Dragoon, be diligent and alert; and preach this welcome Doctrine to your *Miquelets*, *Plunder without Danger*.

Your Friend,

PETERBOROW.

This Letter was given to two several persons: the one instructed and order'd by such an hour in the Morning, to pretend the betraying of it into the hands of the *Conde de las Torres*; the other was to remain hid in the mountains, and agreed with to endeavour to give it in the night to Collonel *Jones*. This Man was really persuaded, that the number of Troops was as considerable as was pretended; the first was order'd to say nothing of our Force, least he might be expos'd to ill usage, when the truth came to be discover'd. When he had given the Letter, he had direction to inform where the other Spy was hid, upon condition made for the security of his Life. Whether the artificial account of the one, or the sincere confession of the other prevail'd, is not known.

known: but 'tis certain that as soon as the Letter was translated, orders were given to prepare for a march: and not long after, when upon a retreat of a small party of the Enemy, some of our Men approach'd the top of the Hill which overlooks St. *Mattheo*, the whole Army was in the utmost Confusion, the Soldiers striking their Tents, loading their Baggage, and preparing to quit the Siege.

In a very little time the Troops of the Earl of *Peterbarow* appear'd on the top of the adjoining mountain, not above random Cannon shot from some part of the Enemies Camp. The Country, which was full of little rising Grounds and Valleys, and cover'd with Olive Trees, being favourable for such an approach, and the Enemies ad-

vanc'd party being driven into the Camp before any judgment cou'd be form'd of our Strength, it was easie for my Lord to make a shew of his forces to advantage. This surprize made their fears as great as could be desir'd, and had we had any proportion of Troops, we had a fair opportunity of cutting them all off. But we were content to let 7000 Men go off without being attack'd; and thought it enough to raise the Siege with a force so disproportionate, as that of 1200: after his Lordship found not only all the informations, that engag'd him in that Attempt, intirely wrong, but his circumstances so very difficult, as would have deterr'd any other Man from so hazardous an undertaking.

How

How important the relief of this place was thought at Court, and how little expected, may be seen by two Letters of Mr. Crow, then acting as the Queen's Minister at *Barcelona*: which tho' sent within two days of one another, are very remarkable for the different air they are writ with.

My

My Lord,

I Do not want to know what your Excellency will think of the Coherence of this with my last Letter. I hope you make no dependence on them, nor any thing that is not immediately under your own Command. There is nothing here but *Distrust, Discontent, and Despair.*

*Barcelona the
12th of Ja-
nuary, 1706.*

M. Crow.

My

My Lord,

I Was as Melancholy as the Weather, our Circumstances, and the thoughts of your Enterprize could make me. I durst scarce open your Excellencies of the 10th, because it came from Court; but the first Line dispers'd all those Splematick Fumes, and I give your Excellency a thousand Embraces and *Horabuenas* as a Person whose happy Influence and Conduct redeems (with his own) the Fortune of Kings. I went to the Palace, and there receiv'd the Compliments of all the Nobility on the part of your Excellencies happy Success; and I assure you, my Lord, the King exprest an extraordinary Satisfaction in your Excellencies much applauded Conduct, which has not only put new lives into the Ministers, but prolong'd those that were almost expiring at the Altar of *St. Cajetano*. Messages have so taken up this Morning, that I am afraid the the Express will depart, before I can shut up this.

Ahu-

Ahumadas's Regiment has positive Orders (contrary to the Opinion of a *Junto* before the King) to return from wherever they are to *Lerida*, so I hope Colonel *Wills* is March'd.

Barcelona Jan. the
14th, 1704.

M. Crom.

The

The Earl of *Peterborow* pass'd thro' *St. Matteo*, having before resolv'd which way to make a shew of pursuing the Enemy, without intirely exposing his little body, if they shou'd be better inform'd, and lay aside their panick fear. So while they march'd thro' a narrow plain which leads to *Valencia*, my Lord took along the edge of the Hills to a place call'd *Albocazer*, not far distant from *St. Matteo*, and a little to the right of the Enemy.

In this place the Earl of *Peterborow* receiv'd an Express from the King, with all these dismal accounts at once: That the Duke of *Noyailles* was entring with near eight thousand men into *Catalonia*, from the side of *Roussillon*; That the body under *Serclas Tilly* in *Arragon* was 4000 or 5000,
and

and pressing upon all the places near *Lerida*; That the Duke of *Anjou* with *Mareschal de Tesse* was forming a body of 10000 near *Madrid*; which wou'd soon be in motion, besides the Troops under the Duke of *Berwick* on the side of *Portugal*. After these informations, the King was pleas'd to acquaint his Lordship, that he was oblig'd to countermand the 1000 Foot and 300 Horse which was appointed to joyn him, and were already come almost as far as *Tortosa*. The Letters from Court at the same time represented the necessity of defending *Catalonia*, but above all things the care and preservation of the King's Person: but however, in this matter my Lord had no positive Orders from the King, tho' he had receiv'd before very pressing ones for passing the

the *Ebro*, and relieving *St. Matheo*.

His Lordship finding the Forces, that were to joyn him were countermanded, had nothing else to comfort him but a Plenipotentiary Commission sent him by the King of *Spain* to do what he thought fit, with a strong reinforcement of Compliments and Authorities, instead of Troops. By which his Lordship was only made liable to be accus'd either of losing the Kingdom of *Valencia*, if he re-pais'd the *Ebro*; or the King's Person, if he did not return to the defence of *Catalonia*, expos'd to such imminent danger. And at this time his Foot were marching in the stony Mountains, and in a Winter-season; without Cloaths or Shooes and his few Dragoons were upon

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on Horses that cou'd hardly go. In these circumstances his Lordship advis'd with his Officers; who were unanimously of opinion, that all endeavours ought to be us'd for the speedy support of *Catalonia*.

At
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Richa
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At a Council of War, consisting of General and Field-Officers, held at the Town of Albocazer, Jan. 12th, 1706. N. S.

P R E S E N T

Richard Gorges.

Robert Killegrew.

Edward Pearce.

Thomas Allen.

J. St. Pierre.

Josline Mead.

Archibald Hamilton.

Thomas Allnutt.

D. Collberg.

Charles Steward.

Don Joseph Bellver

Thomas Phillips.

SOME Spies, Prisoners, and Deserters having been examin'd about the Force of the Enemy, they all agree that their Horse consisted of three of
Q their

their best Regiments, and one of Dragoons, besides two hundred Horse of the Duke of Aragon's Guards: It appears likewise, that the Regiment of Horse of *Pozo Blanco* was before them ready to join, and a Regiment of Dragoons within three Days March. The Regiment of Horse, if compleat, consists of twelve Troops of thirty Men each, all which, when together at the lowest computation, will amount to above two Thousand Horse; and their Foot to about twenty eight hundred. It appears to the Council of War, by Advices, Letters and Accounts, that a Body of five hundred Horse and fifteen hundred Foot, were come near to *Valencia* under *Velasco*; and by the confession of the Deserters and Prisoners, the Enemy were marching with intention to join them, depending upon a Correspondence in *Valencia*. The Forces, with which the Siege of *St. Matthew* was rais'd, consisted of a thousand Foot and less than two Hundred Dragoons, the Enemy being surpris'd, who were not inform'd of the March; upon the Retreat of the Enemy the Forces march'd after them, a long and tedious March over the Mountains to *Albocacer*; where

the

Campaign of Valencia. 227

the Earl of *Peterborow* receiving Advices from Court, that the Regular Troops of the Duke of *Anjou* were encreas'd to twelve Thousand Men on the Frontiers of *Aragon*, besides near six Thousand, which were between him and *Valencia*, the nine Hundred Foot that remain'd being Fatigu'd, and almost bare Foot with continu'd Marches over the Rocks and Mountains, his Lordship call'd a Council of War, where the Officers present of the Allies, and those of the King of *Spain*, were unanimously of Opinion, not to advance further on the Plains towards *Valencia*, but to attempt *Peniscola*, Marching towards *Kineros*; a proper Post to expect the Troops, that are coming to join: Which Post was not so far from *Tortosa*, but that his Lordship might employ his Forces to the relief of *Catalonia*, and pass the *Ebro*, if occasion requir'd, as likewise assist *Valencia* as soon as requir'd; his Lordship marching to follow the Enemy for some time with a small party of Horse, to observe their Motion. At the same time, by intercepted Letters from the Count *St. Estevan* Vice-Roy of *Aragon*, it appear'd to the Council of War, that five Thou-

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find Men more were marching under the Duke of *Arcos*, and were within five Leagues of *Valencia*: So that finding the last Orders from Court were to give an entire Liberty to the Earl of *Peterborough* to act in all things as he pleas'd, whereas his former were positive and without any liberty, commanding the relief of *St. Mattheo*, upon Intelligences wholly groundless, which prevented his Lordship in a much more considerable Service, he having it in his Power to pass the Enemy and to get near a Thousand Horses, and put himself with three Thousand Men into *Valencia*: And it being left to the Earl of *Peterborough's* Judgment upon the Intelligence from Court, to act as he pleas'd: The whole Council of War were of Opinion, it might highly reflect on them in point of Judgment, and be lay'd to their Charge, if they did not advise his Lordship, so to Post the Troops with him, as not to be cut off from being able to assist the King in Person, and to pass to the Defence of *Catalonia*, in the extream Necessity, which in all probability may be expected.

per A. Parly.

The

The whole Council of War having advis'd his Lordship to think of nothing but the defence of *Catalonia*, and the King's Person; and his *Catholick* Majesty having intimated his expectations, That his Lordship wou'd compleat the Conquest of *Valencia*, tho' at the same time he recall'd the few Troops, that were design'd for that Kingdom: it will be easily conceiv'd, how difficult it was, if not impossible, for the Earl of *Peterborough* to reconcile these different opinions, and to satisfy the expectations of both. Against these Forces of the Enemy; against these orders from the Court; against these unanimous and reasonable opinions of a Council of War, few Generals wou'd have had such a thought, and fewer wou'd have executed such an attempt, as the

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reduction of a Kingdom with 200 Horse and 900 Foot, in the condition afore taken notice of.

The Earl of *Peterbarow* so far comply'd with the opinion of the Council of War, as to give orders to the Foot, with a small Party of Horse, to march back to *Vinaros*, a little Town on the Sea-side, six Leagues distant from *Tortosa*; where, in case of necessity, he cou'd embarque the Foot in Boats, and sling them securely into the *Ebro*. But the Officers were surpriz'd, when they found his Lordship resolv'd, with a Party of Horse, to pursue such an Army. The parting was very melancholy; and their fears were the greater, when my Lord assur'd them he wou'd yet endeavour, however our circumstances seem'd desperate, to secure the King-

Kingdom of *Valencia*; and, That since the King thought Conquest possible in the present case, his Majesty cou'd not complain of his Lordship's motions, however rash they might appear. His Lordship therefore was resolv'd never to re-pass the *Ebro*, without positive orders from the King: and explain'd himself very fully upon that subject to his Majesty, in the following Letter.

*A Letter from the Earl of
Peterborow to the King of
Spain.**Sir,*

THE Honour your Majesty does me in your last Letter would give me Courage, had I more Enemies to deal with: you promise me, Sir, to confide in me, and assure me of your Esteem and Friendship. It is too much, the recompence is too great; but I desire your Majesty to believe, that I will do all in my Power, not to be wholly unworthy of your Favours. There is nothing more true, than that I most certainly desire some Credit with your Majesty; but I take God to witness, it is for no private Interest, and I have only wished for it to be able to serve you; it is your Establishment, that I desire above all things.

Your

Your Majesty has confer'd particular Honours upon me, which I can't deserve. But, Sir, both the *English* Minister and my self have apprehended, we have had little share in your Councils. If our Advices had been approv'd; if your Majesty had trust-ed us in the management of your Troops, they had been now in a condition to have oppos'd your Enemies: If your Majesty had permitted me to have March'd into the Kingdom of *Valencia*, when I so earnestly desir'd it, without making me stay under pretence of the March of Imaginary Troops: If your Majesty would have believ'd me upon that occasion, your Majesty probably had not only had at this time a Vice-Roy of *Valencia*, but the Kingdom.

With what I have, I march strait to *Valencia*. I can take no other Measures, leaving the rest to Providence. Your Majesty has made me pass the *Ebro*, with positive Orders for the relief of this Kingdom; it is but reasonable that your Majesty give me the like Orders to repass that River, when the Succouring of *Catalonia* requires it. If the Time lost (so much
against

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against my Inclination) exposes me
to a Sacrifice, at least I will perish
with Honour, and as a Man deserv-
ing a better Fate.

*At the 27th
of Jan, 1703.*

Peterborough.

This resolution, taken by the

At

At the same time his Lordship sent again orders to the thousand *Spanish* Foot and three hundred Horse to enter into *Valencia*; and in case his Majesty shou'd again remand them to *Larida*, after having taken such a march from thence to the borders of *Valencia*, his Lordship had sent positive orders for Coll. *Wills*, to march immediately with an equal number of Horse and Foot to his assistance.

This resolution, taken by the Earl of *Peterborow*, produc'd the desir'd effect, and orders were sent to the *Spanish* forces to follow the direction of the *English* General: since it appear'd, that his Lordship was resolv'd otherwise to have an equal number of *English* out of the same place, to which these *Spanish* Troops were to return. In the mean while,
my

my Lord pursu'd the Enemies Army with a party of Horse: the word won't be thought improperly us'd, since the Enemy march'd twenty leagues with the same precipitation, as they fled from St. Mattheo; and were (by the same artifices us'd to make them raise the Siege) perswaded, that they were follow'd by considerable Forces.

It may easily be imagin'd, what rest a Party cou'd have, that was employ'd in such a design, and appear'd now one side, now on the other, to give alarms by day and night to the Enemy: and what fatigues a General underwent, who was oblig'd to lead them in Person every step, and was perpetually busie in contriving those artifices and stratagems, by which alone the enterprize cou'd succeed. To enter into all
the

the particulars of this action, wou'd be to make it almost incredible; I shall only relate one passage, which will give us a just Idea of the whole.

After several days march, the Enemies whole Army came to a place call'd *Nules*, within three days march of *Valencia*, and one from *Castillon de la Plana*, which was a Town populous, rich, well affected, tho' in the Enemies hands, and abounding in Horses. *Nules* was the most disaffected Town in all the Kingdom to the Interests of King *Charles*, and fortify'd with the most regular towers, with the best walls, and in the best repair. It was necessary to drive the Enemy from this place, and, if possible, to possess *Nules*, and some other little wall'd Towns, which cover'd

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ver'd *Castillon*, such as *Villa Real*,
Burriana, &c.

The Enemy march'd away
from *Nules*, and left a thousand
of the Towns-People well arm'd
in it. There was little hopes,
that his Lordship should gain ad-
mittance there: but the Enemy
having the day before, partly by
force, partly by treaty, got into
Villa Real, and under pretence
of their resistance, put them all
to the Sword; his Lordship flat-
ter'd himself that Terror, might
prevail on the inhabitants of
Nules, and took a resolution as
bold as fortunate. He rode in
Person with his Party of Horse
up to the Gates of the Town,
under the shot of all their Mus-
quets, and requir'd them imme-
diately to send him out their
chief Magistrate or a Priest, if
they wou'd avoid being put to
the

the Sword without mercy, as soon as the Artillery or Miners cou'd make a breach. Some Priests, who knew the Earl of *Peterborough*, came out; my Lord to improve their frights, allow'd them but six minutes time to return with an answer. The Gates were immediately open'd: and here the Earl of *Peterborough* began to form that Cavalry, which secur'd the Kingdom of *Valencia*, and contributed to save *Barcelona*; taking near 200 Horse in this place, where the Enemy an hour before had 3000 men. After this action, which forc'd the Duke of *Anjou's* Troops to a second march the same day, to get further from so terrible an Enemy, his Lordship made a short turn, and came to *Castillon de la Plana*.

In

In this considerable Town, and some of the adjacent Places, his Lordship procur'd and bought near 800 Horses, under the Enemies nose : persuading the whole Country, that his Army was now following the Enemy, and driving them out of the Country, and that some of his Troops would march back to take possession of the Horses, he had now provided. The dispatch, the persuasions, the arts us'd upon this occasion, are not to be conceiv'd : the whole had at that very time a Romantick Air, tho' every particular was before adjusted and prepar'd by his Lordship.

No surprize, I believe, was equal to that of the Officers and Soldiers of Colonel Pierce's Regiment; who had orders to march from *Vinaros*, where they were sent with the rest of the 900

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English Infantry, to a place call'd *Oropesa*, four leagues from *Castillon de la Plana*. In this place by ten in the morning, they were met by the Earl of *Peterborough*, in a plain just bordering on the Town. His Lordship having made a review, was complimenting the Regiment, and wishing that he had but Horses and Acoutrements, to try whether a *Corps* of so good a character would maintain the like reputation upon such a change. It is not to be doubted, that they concurr'd with his Lordship in his wishes; little expecting the execution of them in a moment. But his Lordship having order'd his Secretary to give the Commissions already prepar'd, the Officers at last believ'd the General in earnest, when turning to the edge of the Hill, they

R saw

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saw eight bodies of Horse drawn up separately, and found them all ready accoutred. Among these there were three good Horses for each Captain, two for each Lieutenant, and one for the Cornet. My Lord left to the Field-Officers the choice of their Troops, the other Captains drew Lots ; and immediately they all mounted and marched to the Quarters, appointed for them.

The like care the Earl of *Peterborough* had taken for the dismounted *English* and *Spanish* Dragoons, having in Barks brought Saddles, Arms and Accoutrements to the nearest place on the Sea-side in eight or nine days, when at the same time his Lordship was in continual motion, and had driven the Enemy twenty leagues before him. His Lordship having by this means from
two

two hundred, encreas'd his Horse to a thousand, left them in quarters in little walled Towns, which were well affected, all about *Castillon de la Plana*, and where they could not be insulted by the Enemy without Cannon. He gave orders for marches from place to place, with the proper cautions; and by this means confirm'd the Country, and the Enemy in the belief, that we had a considerable body in those parts: he writ Letters to *Valencia*, promising them to come to their relief, and soon to force the Enemy out of the Country. And left orders to his Secretaries to continue a correspondence with that place, as if he were in those parts, tho' his Lordship immediately took Post for *Tortosa*.

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The reason of his Lordship's going thither, was to see whether the King had been prevail'd with to let the Troops first designed march, or to hear how near Coll. *Wills* might be come to *Tortosa*, in case the *Spanish* Regiments continued under contrary orders. When his Lordship came to *Vinaros*, he found that the *Spanish* Troops had made a days march into *Valencia*, and that some of the Militia of *Catalonia* and *Valencia* were likewise come to their rendezvouz. With these Troops thus assembled the Earl of *Peterborough* immediately march'd with a design to relieve *Valencia*, and secure that Kingdom against an Enemy, who had (after all his Lordship could do) double the number of well-disciplin'd and veteran

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teran Troops, both in Horse and Foot.

The Earl of *Peterborow* could hardly expect to deceive an Enemy, and to disguise his own weakness, for so considerable a time, as was necessary; but having nothing else to trust to, he happily succeeded by the help of a few *English* Dragoons well chosen, and some sober Subalterns well instructed, together with the People of the Country, who, of all Men, are the best qualified for such a purpose. And if the great art of War seems chiefly to consist in gaining true intelligence, and at the same time imposing upon the Enemy, his Lordship had this part of a General in perfection.

He sent at once twenty Spies forwards into the Country from *St. Mattheo*, knowing the Route

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the Enemy must take ; appointing them the places from whence, and the time when they should bring in to the General the pretended Intelligences. It were too tedious to relate all the several pretences and directions, tho' my Lord has them all in writing. The Spies upon the second days march of the Enemy were very successful, and oblig'd the Army to a march in the night. The *Spaniards* employ'd by my Lord inform'd the *Conde de las Torres* of a considerable force, that were upon his left, and somewhat before him ; which, as he told him, certainly designed to take some passes, which might prevent his entrance into the plains which lead to *Valencia*, and that there were *English* Troops among them. This the *Spanish* General thinking impossible,

ble, the Spy offer'd to give any two or three Officers he pleas'd to appoint, the satisfaction of seeing, what he affirm'd. Upon this, two Officers in the Country-habit, went along with him to a place, where, pretending to alight and refresh themselves, they were siezed by ten *English* Dragoons, that were posted there on purpose, and had marched in the Mountains all night with the Spies. The *Spaniards* thus surpriz'd and seiz'd, the Spy pretended the Guard was drunk; and the Officers seeing a couple of Dragoons lying along in that condition, slipp'd into the Stable, and took three of the Dragoon Horses with their accoutrements; this was enough to confirm the Intelligence, and to gain credit to the Spy; Officers of this Country never failing, to mag-

nifie their dangers and escapes. Sometimes the Dragoons were brought Prisoners, by consent, into their Camp by Country-People, seeming in their Interest. By such artful means, and by such diligent application, a little body of Men, about twelve or thirteen hundred Horse, and two thousand Foot, were brought to join in the neighbourhood of *Castillon de la Plana*.

The time necessary to get these Forces together with some of the Militia, gave the Enemy leisure, and the opportunity of hindring Provisions from coming into *Valencia*: we may easily conceive how the nearness of so powerful an Enemy frightened a People, naturally very fearful: at least we may frame a true notion of their apprehensions, from the following Letters they sent to his Lordship.

Most

Most Excellent Sir,

WE acknowledge the highest obligation, we owe your Excellency, for the great Design you have in Hand, to favour and succour us in such pressing Circumstances of having the Enemy so near this City, executing those Hostilities, which we have in other Letters represented and repeated to your Excellency: and that we can only expect our Redemption from your powerful Assistance; which must be afforded with that Diligence, the imminent Danger we are in requires. Wherefore we beg once more, that your Excellency will be pleas'd to hasten your Marches, without employing your Troops to any other Services than our Succour, since it admits of no delay; for the Enemy have cut away the Water which came to our Mills, and this Morning they have prevented, that not one drop of Water comes to the Town, which will reduce us to the utmost Extremities, there being a great want of Meal; we pray therefore with the utmost Respect and Submission, that your Excellency will not suffer this City to be lost,
since

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since your Excellency has our Relief in your Power alone; which we shall eternally acknowledge, and ever endeavour to promote your Excellencies Service, as a Token of our Gratitude and and punctual Obsequiousness.

God preserve your Excellencies Person many Years in its greatest Splendor.

Valencia Fan: the
26th, 1706.

*The Jurats, Racional, &
Syndich of the City
of Valencia.*

Vicent Ramon Secretary.

Most

Most Excellent Sir,

BEing to answer two Letters I have receiv'd from your Excellency, of the 21st and 24th Instant in the first place I am to give your Excellency repeated thanks for your Favours, and am always at your Service with all possible Submission: and next I am to acquaint you, that the Enemy have left *Moncada*, and are remov'd to *Torrente*, coming nearer to us, and intirely investing us; yesterday they cut away the Water of a Mill in this Town, and we having no Horse to cover the Country, the Enemy do every thing they please: To this Misfortune may be added the cruel Hostilities they commit in the Country: After they have rais'd heavy Contributions, after they have drawn all their Provisions from them, they abuse their Persons, take away their Wives, cut down the Trees, destroy the Fields, and burn their Houses, after having Pillag'd 'em without any distinction, even to Churches. These and other execrable Hostilities afflict us not a little, and may shake even the best and most loyal Subjects His Majesty has, apprehending the like usage,
if

if they see those depravations continuing in their Neighbourhood, without being in condition, (as we are not at present) to remove them from us: and as the number of the ill affected increases every Day, and your Excellencies arrival is delay'd, which they have so often believ'd, and as often been deceiv'd in, the common People begin to despair, and the rumour is spread abroad, that your Excellency nor your Troops ever design to come, and that General *Ramos* and my self have deluded the People.

This mortifies us not a little, who know your Excellencies Inclinations and Desires; but I must venture to say, that if your Excellency was but here in Person without your Troops, it would exceedingly animate every Man, who tho' they are now Dispirited by those Cruelties I have mention'd, and the Considerations of their being expos'd to further Invasions without a sufficient Defence, yet show a Love and Affection to our Monarch, which is not to be express'd, and repose a confidence in your Excellency, which is incredible.

For these Reasons I heartily beg of your Excellency with all Submission and
Since-

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Sincerity, in my own Name, and that of all those afflicted Subjects, be pleas'd to deliver and protect us from these great Tribulations, using all imaginable diligence, that you may at the same time give an universal Consolation, and establish the Preservation of this City and Kingdom, which hath no other nor greater Hopes than in your Excellency, from whose Zeal and Compassion I promise my self the utmost compliance.

God preserve your Excellency the many Years I desire and have need of.

Valencia Jan. the
28th, 1706.

Cardona.

The

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The Duke of *Arcas*, who then commanded, kept the main of his Army to the right of *Valencia*, towards a place call'd *Torrente* : but sent Brigadier *Maboni* with a detachment of Horse to secure the strongest pass in the Country, over a River which was just under the Walls of *Moluedro*, the ancient *Saguntum*, so famous in the Roman History. This place, which is about four Leagues distant from *Valencia*, my Lord must pass ; for no other way was practicable. All the Officers were of opinion, That his Lordship must come to a full stop here, having no Artillery, no Miners, no preparations to take a walled Town ; where, besides numerous Inhabitants, all arm'd and zealous for the Duke of *Anjou*, there was a very good General-Officer, and eight hundred men, near half of
 them

them being *Maboni's* Regiment of *Irish* Dragoons. What made our circumstances the more desperate in appearance, this place was for us most unfortunately situated; because after passing the River, there was a plain of two leagues to a *Cartbusian* Convent, where the Enemy to all advantage might make use of their Horse, which were excellent, and double in number.

The Earl of *Peterborow* gave the Officers hopes, that what he could not do by force, he did not fear but to compass by Art: and told them, That if he could but prevail to get *Maboni* to come out to speak with him, he was almost confident of getting immediate possession of the Town, and the opportunity of passing the Plains without opposition.

Mol-

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Molviedro lies about a league from the Sea, the greatest part of the Town upon a flat, except the side rising towards the Castle, which stands on a high Hill. On the right runs a long ridge of Mountains; but a little above Cannon-shot from the place, there is, towards the Country, a little round Hill, distinct by itself: our Troops came towards the Town by a great descent; and the way towards the pass was behind the round rising ground, turning short on the left to the River.

The place of the interview intended by his Lordship, was on the side of this little rising ground next *Molviedro*; behind which my Lord had stolen some of his Troops towards the pass, which were come in view of the Town: the rest were at the same time march-

marching on purpose to make a shew, and coming down the Hills, the Soldiers edging as it were the Country People on that side, where they could be seen. The few Field-pieces we had were dispos'd to the like advantage; and every thing was set in a sort of perspective to the place of the Interview.

The Scene being thus prepar'd, the Earl of *Peterborow* sent an Officer and Trumpet into the Town to *Mahoni*, to let him know; That it should not be his fault, if the Country were expos'd to unnecessary hardships and ruine, it being the Interest of both sides to prevent it, since each had a chance to be master of it: That, besides, he should be glad to have an interview with a Country-man of so good a Reputation; That such a conference

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ference could have no ill consequence, and might have some good; and that he was ready to meet him with ten or twelve Horse, in any convenient place betwixt his troops and the Town. My Lord had the more hopes of succeeding in this project, since, that besides in these Conferences every body presumes to make his own advantage, he thought it might be reasonable enough that *Mahani* shou'd be glad of a Capitulation, and an opportunity to join his Horse with that of the Duke of *Arcos*, in order to prevent our passing the Plains towards the *Carthusian Convent*.

The *Conde de las Torres*, the best Officer in *Spain*, (but by many thought no Enemy to the House of *Austria*) was luckily recall'd, upon pretended faults found in his Conduct, in relation to the
siege

siege of *St. Mattheo*: so that the Earl of *Peterborow* met an advantage he well improved, a General just come to an Army, a Man of great Quality, but no Soldier of service.

Makoni return'd an Officer with this compliment, That he would immediately wait upon the Earl of *Peterborow*, upon his Lordship's parole for his security; being desirous to shew him any proper respect, and to concert measures with him that might prevent any disorders, but those which were inevitable in War. This Gentleman being related to the late Countess of *Peterborow* of the *Tomond* Family, was the more inclined to pay any civility to his Lordship.

He came, with some of the principal Officers of the *Spanish* Forces, to the place where his

Lordship receiv'd him, as the most proper to make an advantageous shew of his strength: and after he was entertain'd upon a subject which had no effect, my Lord's second design was more successful. It was not improper for my Lord to offer the most pressing motives to encline him to take part with King *Charles III.* and to support them with the greatest offers; which were refus'd upon the Principles of Honour, and the impossibility of leaving a service to which he was engag'd, for any advantages. But as all pass with great Compliments, the Earl of *Peterborough*, to shew how sensible he was of his confidence in coming to him, told him, That he was willing to return his marks of Esteem, with what he conceiv'd he would be well pleas'd with,
and

and which might prevent likewise some unavoidable Cruelties very much against his Inclination. 'The Spaniards, says he, 'have us'd such severities and 'cruelties at *Villa Real*, as will 'oblige me to retaliate. I am 'willing to spare a Town, that 'is under your Protection: I 'know you cannot pretend to 'defend it with the Horse you 'have; which will be so much 'more useful in another place, 'if join'd with the Duke of *Ar-*
'*cos* to obstruct my passing the 'Plains of *Valencia*. I am confident, you will soon quit *Mol-*
'*viedro*; which I can as little 'prevent, as you can hinder me 'from taking the Town. The 'Inhabitants then must be ex-
'pos'd to the utmost Miseries; 'and I can no otherwise pre-
'vent it, but by being ty'd by

' a Capitulation ; which I am
 ' willing to give you, if I had
 ' the pretence of the immediate
 ' surrender of the place this very
 ' night. Some cales are so ap-
 ' parent, that I need not dissem-
 ' ble: I know you will imme-
 ' diately send to the Duke of
 ' *Arcos* to march to the *Cartbu-*
 ' *sian Convent*, and meet him
 ' there with the body of Horse
 ' under your Command. My
 Lord, with a pretended frankness
 offer'd him, if he pleas'd, to let him
 see his Troops, and the Artillery
 which he had; and besides told him
 what he could bring from the Sea.

Maboni seem'd almost to con-
 fess, that his part was to strength-
 en the Duke of *Arcos* with his
 Horse, and laughing, said to my
 Lord, I may say so to your Lord-
 ship; who is sensible of it, but
 cannot prevent it. The Brigadier
 how-

however seem'd to be very well pleas'd with my Lord's openness, and told his Lordship, he would go back into the Town, and send an answer in half an hour. The Capitulation was agreed upon, and the answer came by the chief of the *Spanish* Officers: with whom my Lord had occasion to talk and to feel his Pulse, but finding no probability of prevailing on him to change sides, he contriv'd all he could (and not without success) to give him jealousies of *Maboni*.

Maboni, (who of his side manag'd this matter with a great deal of Dexterity, and very much like an Officer, had his advices been follow'd) in his Capitulation had agreed not to quit the place till about one at night, neither was the Earl of *Peterborough* to pass the River, till that hour. This

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was to get time for the Duke of *Arcas* to have made the march to the Plains, and the Brigadier allow'd himself the time before day break to have gain'd the same Post. But the Earl of *Peterborough* so encreas'd the jealousy betwixt the *Spanish* Officers and *Maboni*, that the latter was forc'd to send to my Lord, to let him know, that his Lordship was oblig'd in honour to the most sincere and punctual compliance with his Capitulation, and confess'd to him that he was in danger from the *Spanish* Troops, even for his Person, if there were not the greatest assurances and evidences given of the performance of his Word.

I am satisfied nothing would have engag'd the Earl of *Peterborough* to the least breach of faith; nor could any consideration have

ju-

justified his Lordship in going over the pass of the River, till the appointed time; the Enemy upon agreement having withdrawn their Dragoons, which defended the Intrenchments on the other side. But my Lord having over-heard the neighing of Horses in the night, took it for granted, that some part of the Troops had evacuated the Town; and that if the noise of Firing was heard, it might cause a jealousy, that they were attack'd; and so produce the desir'd effects of his plot upon the Duke of *Arcos*, if any of the *Spanish* Officers should arrive in the Enemies Camp, persuaded of an ill design in *Mahoni*. Upon this, my Lord order'd a party of Men a little up the River, with directions to make discharges, that might resemble

an Engagement of small parties. *Maboni* sent immediately to my Lord to let him know, that whatever Umbrage was given, he depended upon his word, and would never believe, there could be of his side any foul play.

Maboni was so pressed, that many of his Officers solicited his immediate march, but his aim was not to move till one a Clock, to give time to the Duke of *Arcos*; and the point my Lord was labouring, was to improve the suspicions and jealousies of the *Spaniards*. He thought the Message from *Maboni* gave him a good occasion; and therefore sent back an Officer with this seeming compliment, which succeeded to his wish, and entirely accomplish'd what he aim'd at.

My

My Lord beg'd of *Mahoni*, to consent, that for his Security from any Accident, he might order a Regiment of Dragoons to pass the River, and wait the hour appointed, under the walls of the town; that his own Officers might accompany them, and send them to the proper place; his Lordship having order'd two thirds of the Officers to come into the town, and put themselves into his hands, as Hostages for the exact and honourable performance of all Articles.

Upon the march of these troops towards the town, most of the *Spanish* Officers, with the detachments they commanded, marched separately towards the Duke of *Arcos*; and some left their men, to give their General an account of what had pass.

My

My Lord, as his Officers conceiv'd, had two insuperable difficulties: the one, to get possession of *Molviedro*, and secure the pass on the River; the other, to pass the two leagues of the Plains, which were betwixt *Molviedro* and *Valencia*, before so good and so strong a body of Horse. My Lord was in hopes, if he succeeded in one, to compass the other: and to that end, as soon as he found the treaty in a fair way, he chose two *Irish* Dragoons out of *Zinzendorf's* Regiment, which he well instructed and well paid, and sent immediately as Deserters to the Duke of *Arcos*. He promised to make them Officers, if they succeeded: which was punctually made good to one, who well had deserv'd it; the other dying soon after his return.

They

They were to discover to the Duke of *Arcos*, That being hid under the rocks of the hill, where they were drinking a Glasse of Wine, they had hear'd all the discourse betwixt the Earl and *Maboni*: that they saw five thousand Pistoles delivered, and, that *Maboni* was to be a Major-General upon the *English* and *Spanish* Establishment, and to command a body of ten thousand *Irish Catholics*, which were raising for the service of King *Charles*. They agreed with the Duke of *Arcos* to have no reward, if he were not soon made sensible of the truth of what they said, by *Maboni* himself: since they were persuaded that he would soon send to engage the Duke of *Arcos*, to march immediately with the whole Army towards the *Cartusian* Convent, under pretence
of

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of joining with his Horse, in order to prevent the Earl of *Peterborow* from passing the Plains of *Molviedro*: but that, whereas this march must be made in the night, all matters were so agreed and contriv'd betwixt the Earl and *Maboni*, and the troops so placed, that he must fall into the ambushes designed, and run great hazards of an entire defeat.

It fell out, that soon after these Spies had given this account to the Duke of *Arcos*, *Maboni's* *Aid de Camp*, arriv'd with Proposals exactly to the same purpose; the *Spanish* General (whose suspicions were confirm'd by the jealousies, the Earl of *Peterborow* had rais'd, in several of the *Spanish* Officers, that were come from *Molviedro*, to him) instead of complying with the immediate march proposed by *Maboni*, remov'd

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mov'd his Camp quite the contrary way. *Maboni* with his horse expected the whole Army at the *Cartusian Convent*, till the approach of the Earl of *Peterborough* made him retire to the Duke of *Arcos's* Camp: as soon as he arriv'd, he was secur'd by that General, and sent to *Madrid*. I must add here, that when *Maboni* came to tell his Story at Court, he was made a Major-General, and the Duke of *Arcos* was recall'd.

Thus you have the account of perhaps as remarkable an Action as ever happen'd; a whole Kingdom gain'd with such inferior Forces, almost without any, and without a blow. His Lordship pass'd the Plains, without the sight of an Enemy, to the *Cartusian Convent*; after which he was secure of entring into *Valencia*,

cia, without the possibility of opposition.

What a reception my Lord met with there, may be guess'd by the extremities they were in. I will only say, perhaps nothing was ever equal to this universal joy: it was all extravagant tumultuous Transport. Whole bodies of Priests and Fryars, in their several habits, were Regimented, and drawn up under Arms to receive him; and his Lordship never fail'd to return the highest civilities to, and improve his Interest with the Church.

After this unexpected entry into *Valencia*, when most were full of thoughts of Triumph and Conquest, my Lord was very sensible of his almost desperate condition: which however was to be dissembled to the *Valencians*. His Lordship had little above
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three thousand Men in *Valencia*, where there was neither provisions for a Siege, nor Powder to make any defence withal; the Enemy were seven thousand near the Town; there were four thousand more *Castilians* at *Fuente de Higuera*, within 15 leagues of it, coming to join the *Conde de las Torres*, who was now return'd with *Maboni* to the Command of the Army. At the same time the *Marshall de Tessa* was with ten thousand Men at *Madrid*, with intentions to come to besiege *Valencia*; which must have presently submitted, and sav'd him the disgrace he met with soon after at *Barcelona*. And my Lord had advice of sixteen 24 Pounders being ship'd at *Alicant* in a *Genovesa* Vessel, in order to be brought for the Siege of *Valencia*.

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To prevent the Storm that threaten'd *Valencia*, it was necessary, as well to disperse the four thousand Men at *Fuente de Higuera*, before they could join the main Army, as to take from the Enemy the Artillery and Ammunition, with which they intended to carry on their Siege, and which was wanting to make a defence in *Valencia*. The Earl of *Peterborough* found the happy methods to disappoint the Enemy, in intercepting the 16 battering pieces of their Brass Cannon with all warlike Stores in proportion. The other attempt was equally requisite, but more difficult: since the *Conde de las Torres* was betwixt the Troops, that were come from *Castile*, and the Earl of *Peterborough*; and my Lord's Forces, design'd against this *Castilian* reinforcement, were to pass and repass the River *Xucar*,

ear, near the Enemies Army. However the *Valencians* were witnesses of his Lordships Zeal, Diligence, and Success: and they hardly knew their Danger, till they saw six hundred of the *Castilians* brought into their City; the whole body of them being beaten beyond the *Conde de las Torres's* Army at *Fuente de Higuera*, by four hundred of our Horse and eight hundred Foot, which pass'd in the night near three thousand Horse of the Enemy, and return'd back in safety with their prisoners to *Valencia*.

The *Conde de las Torres*, after this, despairing of any success against *Valencia*, form'd a design upon *Alcira* and *Sueca*; two Towns upon the River *Xucar*, about five leagues from *Valencia*. Upon taking these places, the bridge over the River at *Culle-*

ra would have been in his Power; and *Valencia* would have been depriv'd of two thirds of the Provisions, with which it us'd to be supplied. So perfect intelligence the Earl of *Peterborough* had of the Enemies motions and designs, that he flung some Men into *Sueca*; and sent an Officer to *Alcira*, who prevented the Enemy only by half an hour.

His Lordship put in *Sueca* and *Alcira* about five hundred *English*, and about six hundred *Spanish* Foot, and four hundred *Spanish* Horse; and soon after laid a design, which must unavoidably have given the *Conde de las Torres's* Army an entire defeat, had it not fail'd merely by the scandalous Cowardice of the *Spaniards*. For the *Conde*, having his body divided for conveniency of Quarters, and
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not apprehending to be attack'd at five leagues distance from Valencia, by a force so much inferior: My Lord order'd the Spanish detachment of six hundred Foot and four hundred Horse, to march in the night to surprize one of their Quarters, and at the same time march'd with some Troops himself: they had about two English miles to march, and my Lord fifteen. The march on both sides was perform'd with so much secrecy, that the Enemy had not the least notice of it, till our Troops were very near; but an accidental party of twenty Horse, frightened all the Spanish body of a thousand, who were put into such disorder, that they killed many of their own men, in running back to the place from whence they came. However, the Earl of Peterborough advanced within a mile of

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of the Enemies Army, and retreated five leagues without the least loss.

THUS we have run thro' a Campaign, which perhaps, in regard to the methods that were taken, and the success that attended them, has not its Parallel in any history. And if the World has a mind to be satisfied, why his Lordship was so much favour'd by Fortune, it was because he never depended on her, or upon other people. And I believe he is the only General, who can say, That in totō Campaignes he scarce ever sent a Party of thirty horse upon any action, without going in Person with them. Happy was it for him and the publick, that his constitution cou'd allow him to be so serviceable to himself in a Country, where sometimes his Officers were less capable of serving him,
when

when there was occasion for the Language, tho' they all made him large amends with their Swords. And I must here do that justice to our *Gallant Country-men*, as to say, That perhaps there never was a service, where Officers endur'd more fatigues and hardships, or gave greater proofs of Spirit, Resolution, and Courage, than they did, from the fortunate taking of *Barcelona*, to the fatal Battle of *Almansa*.

The bounds I have set to myself in these short Memoirs, won't let me follow his Lordship further in the glorious progress of his Arms: 'tis a scene indeed of such a fruitful and agreeable variety, as wou'd afford great pleasure to me, and no less entertainment to the Reader. Nor cou'd I deny my self the satisfaction of dwelling longer

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ger upon so inviting a subject; had I not reason to expect, that some abler Pen will deliver down to Posterity, a History of Revolutions so extraordinary, and so much for the honour of the *English* Nation.

F I N I S.

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